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I. Introduction
Looking at the state of women in the contemporary labor market and
the laws that regulate them, I am reminded of the cryptic picture of a young
lady combing her hair before a mirror, which, on closer inspection,
dissolves into an image of an old woman.' The drawing is an optical
illusion in which the same set of lines and shadings, examined from a
different perspective, reveal an entirely different picture. With respect to
women in the workplace, statistics show significant improvement in
women's participation in market work and their compensation relative to
men. Yet beneath this pleasant picture lie significant disparities in the
quality of women's attachment to work and the progression of their careers.
Since the forces that underlie this "attachment gap" are multiple and
complex, the vestiges of inequality that women confront today may, like
the last pounds in a long diet, be the most difficult to lose.2 Unsurprisingly,
scholars have competing ideas as to how these inequalities should be
approached and resolved. Some have focused on using federal
discrimination laws to force employers to create more family-friendly work
environments, 3 while others have argued for whole-scale reorganization of
market work.4 Some have focused on forcing men to pick up the slack at
home,5 while others have argued for greater state responsibility for family
1. To see a rendition of this image, visit http://www.naute.com/illusions/
youngold.phtml.
2. See Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law,
Women's Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 371, 386-87 (2001) (using the phrase "attachment gap" to characterize
the disparity between the quality of women's and men's participation in market work in
terms of benefits, stability, duration, and opportunity for advancement).
3. See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT
AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 101-13 (2000) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER]
(outlining strategies for eliminating features of work structured on the life patterns of male
workers under extant federal law including Title VII and the Equal Pay Act); Kathryn
Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 1183, 1226-33 (1989) (outlining possible approaches for challenging masculine norms
using disparate impact and hostile environment causes of action under Title VII).
4. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1954-56 (2000)
(urging significant overhaul of current standards of work time and compensation to allow all
workers, male and female, the ability to work at a livable pace).
5. See Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1052
(1994) (calling for expanded interpretation of the FMLA to protect workers from
harassment based on their request for leave in order to facilitate men's involvement in
family caregiving); Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L.
REV. 707, 778 (2000) (suggesting that men should be compelled to take family leave upon
Vol. 12:345
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dependency.6 Despite their differences, however, many of these proposals
share a demand for greater employer accommodation of caregiving-
broadly defined as legally mandated affirmative behavior by employers
designed to allow women the opportunity to participate fully in market
work.7 This strategy offers both a unifying theoretical concept and a
vehicle for potentially altering workplace norms that systematically
discriminate against women.
While much work has been done in developing a theory of how best to
accommodate caregiving, 8 to date there has been only minimal critical
attention to the pragmatic implications of the strategy. 9 This is surprising
birth or adoption of a child in order to eliminate discrimination against women rooted in
employers' expectations that female employees will require more leave from work than
male employees); cf Daniel Greenwood, Gender Workers/Market Equality, 13 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 323 (noting that to facilitate women's involvement in market work,
"caretaking must be something that men can do, honorably and prestigiously").
6. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 9 (1995) ("Taking care of someone
such as a child while [he or she is] young . . . is work, represents a major contribution to
society, and should be explicitly recognized as such .... ); Martha Albertson Fineman,
Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 1405-06 (2001) (arguing that the state
should bear responsibility for dependency because caregiving is important and essential to
the public).
7. While I define accommodation broadly, I set apart from this generalization those
proposals that advocate government subsidies to families to support family caregiving.
Whatever the benefits or viability of that system, it does not deal directly with the issue of
employer responsibility for incorporating women into market work, which is the principal
concern of this paper. Such proposals will, however, be briefly considered infra, Part V.A.
8. While caregiving has long been a significant concern of feminist legal scholars, the
last several years have seen a renewed and perhaps increased focus on this topic in legal
literature. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3; Mary Becker, Care and
Feminists, 17 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (2002); Lisa Bornstein, Inclusions & Exclusions in
Work-Family Policy: The Public Values & Moral Code Embedded in the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 77 (2000); Martha Ertman, Love and Work:
A Response to Vicki Schultz's Life's Work," 102 COLUM. L. REV. 848 (2002); Deborah L.
Rhode, Response Essay: Balanced Lives, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 834 (2002); Schultz, supra
note 4; Selmi, supra note 5; Belinda M. Smith, Time Norms in the Workplace: Their
Exclusionary Effect and Potential for Change, I I COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 271 (2002);
Peggie R. Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations in an Era of Work-Family
Conflict: Lessons from Religious Accommodations, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1443 (2001); Joan
Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relieffor Family Caregivers Who Are
Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV WOMEN'S L.J. 77 (2003); Joan Williams, Our
Economy of Mothers and Others: Women and Economics Revisited, 5 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 411, 422-23 (2002); Symposium, The Structures of Care Work, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1389 (2001); Symposium, Workplace and the Family, Subversive Legacies: Learning from
History! Constructing the Future (2002).
9. For an example of scholarship tackling the practical question of how mandated
employer accommodation should be implemented, see, for example, Peggie R. Smith, supra
note 8, at 1472-74, 1467 (proposing a legal model drawn from the religious accommodation
provision of Title VII and unemployment compensation case law to achieve a variety of
workplace accommodations such as reduced and flexible work arrangements). To the extent
2003
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given the abundant literature examining the jurisprudence of
accommodation under existing directives aimed at other disadvantaged
groups, in particular the disabled. ° Accommodation has frequently been
posited as an alternative to the formal equality principles that underlie
much of contemporary discrimination law. Whereas most anti-
discrimination initiatives place only negative directives on employers
prohibiting differential treatment of similarly situated people,
accommodation would require employers to take active steps to enable
disparate groups to perform similarly.1" These differing approaches may be
harmonized on a theoretical level insofar as affirmative conduct is deemed
by many to be a requisite step for achieving across-the-board equality in a
meaningful sense.' 2 Indeed, even Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
the first of the modem equal employment laws, incorporates the concept of
accommodation in its prohibition against religion-based discrimination.
1 3
commentators have raised concerns about the implementation of employer accommodation,
they have largely focused on the risk that such policies will essentialize women and exclude
those who are not caregivers. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few
Troubling Questions about Where, Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should
be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1753, 1756 (2001) (criticizing theories of employer
accommodation for benefiting men with wives at the expense of childless women and
women in professions dominated by men with dependant spouses).
10. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, employers must reasonably
accommodate any qualified disabled employee or job applicant. See 42 U.S.C.A. §
12112(b)(5)(A) (1995); infra part Ill. A body of scholarship has examined judicial
constraints on this directive and exposed a popular backlash against expansive use of this
requirement to protect disabled workers. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword:
Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social
Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2000); infra Part IV.C.
11. The formal equality approach is embodied in legislation such as Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; the Americans with
Disabilities Act adds an accommodation directive to the traditional anti-discrimination
model. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2-2000e-3 (1994 & Supp. 2003) and 29 U.S.C. §623
(1999 & Supp. 2003) ("It shall be unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
age."), with 42 U.S.C. §12112(b)(5)(A) (1995) ("[T]he term discriminate includes not
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such
covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on
the operation of the business of such covered entity .... ). The distinction between these
types of directives will be further considered in Part lI.B., infra.
12. See infra Part lI.B.
13. See 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e(j) (1994) ("[T]he term 'religion' includes all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he
is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.").
The duty to "accommodate" an employee's religious beliefs derives from a 1966 EEOC
interpretative regulation that was relied upon by courts and subsequently incorporated by
amendment into the text of Title VII. See E.E.O.C. Reg. § 1605.1(b) (1966); Kettle v.
Vol. 12:345
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Yet examination of extant accommodation laws suggests that the
relationship is far more complex: In developing a jurisprudence of
accommodation, courts have routinely invoked principles of formal
equality in making both procedural and substantive decisions about
contemporary accommodation statutes that have limited the reach of those
statutes and undermined their goals. 14 In these instances, accommodation
and equality appear less like complementary kin than like competing
principles in tension with one another. In the "optical illusion" created by
federal employment statutes, the novel and progressive accommodation
approach becomes distorted by an entrenched notion of formal equality.
This paper exposes the limitations of mandated accommodation as a
unitary strategy for redressing workplace disadvantage attributable to
caregiving, focusing on the subversion of accommodation by deeply rooted
legal and cultural commitments to formal equality norms. In the pages that
follow, I argue that the obstacles these equality norms pose to realizing true
accommodation are likely to redouble in light of recent changes in the way
people work, or what I describe as the emergence of a "Me, Inc." work
environment. In the "Me, Inc." workplace, employers expect increased
worker independence, demand significant extra-role contributions from
employees, and offer only short-term job security. These developments are
in tension with the concept of greater accommodation by employers or
shared responsibility between co-workers for the caregiving needs of
particular individuals.
The paper proceeds in four parts: Part II addresses the development of
a loose consensus in favor of "equal accommodation" of family caregiving
and how that approach attempts to overcome the historical distinction
between "sameness" and "difference" feminism. Part III demonstrates how
that goal has been undermined by judicial interpretation and application of
accommodation mandates under the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") and the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). Court decisions
pay lip service to the requirement of affirmative conduct, but often become
mired in notions of employer animus and the presence or absence of non-
discriminatory or performance-based rationales for employer conduct,
hallmarks of the formal equality regime. Part IV offers thoughts on how
the tension between accommodation and equality will play out in the new
workplace, arguing that judicial resistance to accommodation is consistent
with the way in which contemporary employers-and to some extent
employees-view their social contract of employment. Part V therefore
closes by suggesting that work/family initiatives focus not on discrete
Johnson & Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 892, 894 (E.D. Ark. 1972) (recognizing affirmative duty
of employer to reasonably accommodate the religious beliefs of its employee who requested
Saturdays off to observe the Sabbath based on § 1605.1(b)).
14. See infra Part I1.
2003
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accommodation mandates, but rather on working within existing
discrimination and collective bargaining laws, supplemented by a
government compensation system that creates incentives for employers to
create efficient voluntary programs to assist caregivers.
II. Feminist Discourse and the Transformative Potential of
Accommodation
Although there is no consensus on the precise remedial efforts needed
to address women's disadvantage, a consistent feature of the discussion is
the recognition by most participants that some form of workplace
accommodation beyond compliance with basic gender discrimination
principles is needed to effectuate equal opportunity for caregivers. 5 This
section describes the emergence of the accommodation concept within
work/family dialogue and its relationship to traditional gender
discrimination prohibitions. The section suggests that the development of
an accommodation model for caregiving has the potential to unify feminists
despite previous theoretical divisions over attention to women's
"differences" and concludes that approaches to caregiving requiring
affirmative employer conduct can coexist on a theoretical level with
traditional anti-discrimination principles.
A. Caregiving and the Limits of Discrimination Law
Both the effects of women's caregiving and the role of
accommodation in discrimination law have long been issues of controversy
within feminist discourse. Early second wave feminists eschewed the
rhetoric of care in their quest for equality, fueling the sameness/difference
debate that has polarized modern feminism.1 6 Title VII of the 1964 Civil
15. See supra, notes 6-8.
16. The crux of this historical debate is whether treating women equally merely requires
that women be given the identical treatment and opportunities granted to men or whether the
law must in some way recognize and account for real differences between men and women.
See generally WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 217-32 (summarizing and
harmonizing views of prominent "equality" and "special treatment" commentators);
Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1291-96
(1987) (distinguishing between "symmetrical" and "asymmetrical" approaches to sexual
equality); Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity
and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1143-44 (1986) (summarizing
equal/special treatment debate as a dispute over whether the harm of discrimination lies in
"not being treated as men are, or ... not being treated as a woman"); Martha L. Fineman,
Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change, A Study of Rhetoric
and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 789, 791,
814-20 (1983) (describing and distinguishing between "rule equality," which relies on
gender-neutral principles, and "result equality," which permits affirmative preferences for
Vol. 12:345
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Rights Act embraces a formal equality approach under which women and
men must be treated alike in regard to terms and conditions of
employment. 17 The avoidance of caregiving and disavowal of any need for
affirmative behavior made sense in light of the troubled history of
"preferential" treatment for women. In earlier times, invocations of
women's "ethic of care" were used to justify everything from maximum
hours laws limiting women's market work participation to outright bars on
women participating in certain forms of work altogether.
18
Title VII and the formal equality approach prohibit the use of such
essentialist and stereotypical characterizations of women's nature as a basis
for limiting their access to market work, and they have been extremely
successful in opening doors to women. They have proven less successful,
however, in achieving equality of result across all job sectors and within
industry-specific hierarchies.' 9 This unfavorable picture is attributable to
women). Mainstream equality feminism resisted attention to women's caregiving
responsibilities for fear that it would undermine the claim that men and women are
fundamentally the same and legitimize adverse differential treatment of women. See
generally Kathryn Abrams, The Second Coming of Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1605, 1607-
10 (2000) (summarizing early feminist objections to the rhetoric of care, including claims
that focus on care essentialized women's experiences and allowed for continued
marginalization of women within male institutions by failing to address societal devaluation
of women's caregiving).
17. 42 U.S.C.A. § 200 0e-2(a) (1994) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to ... refuse to hire or to discharge ... or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
..... ). Based on this language, it would be a violation of the statute to provide any benefit
to a woman that was not available to a man.
18. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (upholding an Oregon statute
limiting number of hours that women could work per week because "healthy mothers are
essential to vigorous offspring, [and] the physical well-being of woman becomes an object
of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race"); Bradwell
v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (affirming state
court decision upholding Illinois statute that prohibited women from practicing law because
"[t]he constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance ...
indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood").
19. For example, as of March 2000, women comprised only 12.5% of corporate officers
of Fortune 500 companies. See Alex Frangos, Executive Positions: Fewer Women Reach
Top of Corporate Ladder, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2000, at NE4; CATALYST, INC., RESEARCH,
CENSUSES at http://www.catalystwomen.org/research/censuses.htm (last visited Sept. 29,
2003) (providing synopsis of research results of 2000 Catalyst Census of Women Corporate
Officers and Top Earners). Women represented only 17% of partners or shareholders in
public accounting firms in 1999 and only 15.63% of partners in law firms in 2001. See
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, WOMEN AND FAMILY ISSUES
SURVEY CF PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS AND PROFESSIONALS APRIL 2000 at
http://www.aicpa.org/download/career/reprt_pubfirms.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2003);
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, A CURRENT
GLANCE AT WOMEN IN THE LAW 2001 at http://www.abanet.org/women/glance.pdf (last
2003
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many causes, perhaps not the least of which is ongoing animus-based
discrimination against women. 20 But increasingly, attention has focused on
the role of women's caregiving activities in influencing both decisions and
choices about women's employment. Whereas women as a group are
faring better in the marketplace relative to men, the statistics comparing
mothers to fathers are far less favorable.2' Despite increases in men's
assumption of family caregiving and housekeeping responsibilities, women
still perform the vast majority of these difficult and time-consuming tasks
and suffer the consequent impact on their market employment.
22
visited Sept. 23, 2003). According to Department of Labor Statistics, in 2002 women
represented only 10.8% of all "engineers," 30.8% of "mathematical and computer
scientists," 0.05% of "mechanics and repairers," and less than 0.03% of workers in the
construction trades. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, CURRENT
POPULATION SURVEY, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EMPLOYED: EMPLOYED PERSONS BY
OCCUPATION, SEX, AND AGE at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaa9.pdf (last visited Sept. 18,
2003). Although the gender wage gap narrowed last year, full-time working women earned
only 77.5% of what their male counterparts earned in 2002. See David Loenhardt, Gap
Between Pay of Men and Women Smallest on Record, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2003, at Al
(summarizing Bureau of Labor Statistics).
20. See Schultz, supra note 4, at 1892-93 (arguing that employers view women as
inauthentic workers who are appropriately excluded from certain professions and paid less
than men who share their occupation); Selmi, supra note 5, at 745-46 (suggesting that
employers discriminate against women by refusing them long-term assignments and access
to mentoring opportunities based on the misperception that women will eventually leave the
work force for family reasons).
21. Mothers' wages are 60% of those of fathers. Williams & Segal, supra note 8, at 78
(2003) (citing Jane Waldfogel, The Family Gap for Young Women in the U.S. and Britain,
16 J. LAB. ECON. 505, 507 (1998)); see also WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3,
at 14-15 (suggesting that nearly half the gender wage gap for women aged thirty is
attributable to childbearing, and at least two-thirds reflects women's role as the primary
caregiver). In 1998, only 34.7% of all women who were mothers of children under the age
of 6 were employed on a full-time basis for the entire year. Phillip N. Cohen and Suzanne
M. Bianchi, Marriage, children, and women's employment: what do we know?, Dec. 1999
MONTHLY LAB. L. REV. 22, 27 (presenting statistics for hours and weeks of paid work for
women aged 25-54) available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1999/12/art3full.pdf (last
visited Sept. 23, 2003); see also Kessler, supra note 2, at 385-86 (summarizing statistics
from early to mid-1990s demonstrating that women with children have significantly less job
attachment than both men with children and women without children).
22. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 14 (explaining economists'
perspective that women "self-select" into jobs requiring lower skill levels and less education
because they expect to leave the workforce to bear children); Kessler, supra note 2, at 378
(finding that women generally retain primary responsibility for housekeeping and childcare
regardless of their work status); ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS
AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 3-4 (1989) (estimating that women work thirty more 24-
hour days per year than men when they work outside of the home and remain the primary
caregiver). I should note that in describing women's and men's comparative participation in
market and family work, I make no conjecture as to the reason for women's
disproportionate assumption of caregiving responsibilities. That is, I leave aside the hotly
debated question whether women are caregivers by nature, whether they are socialized to be
caregivers, or whether they choose caregiving in response to existing labor conditions. See,
Vol. 12:345
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Recognition of the correlation between women's family
responsibilities and workplace disadvantage has forced feminists to
confront and reconstruct both the issue of care and the limits of existing
discrimination law.23  The inadequacy of the traditional discrimination
model in addressing caregiving appears most starkly in the infamous
General Electric v. Gilbert decision concerning employer treatment of
pregnancy.24 There the Supreme Court concluded that the exclusion of
pregnancy-related benefits from an employer's health plan did not
constitute sex discrimination because pregnancy is not a condition that
affects all women.25 The ruling was subsequently superceded by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), but the legacy of its logic persists.
26
Under the PDA, employers must treat pregnancy the same as other
disabling conditions that affect both men and women (or only men).27
There is no requirement under the statute that employers actually provide
for pregnancy in terms of benefits or leave, and employers are free to treat
all employees "equally badly., 28  The PDA does not address women's
e.g., Dowd, supra note 8, at 90 (suggesting that societal views of appropriate female roles
are a driving force behind women's frequent assumption of primary family responsibilities
and long-term departures from market work); Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum,
Women and the Workplace: Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 2154, 2162 (1994) (suggesting that women respond to workforce conditions that
presuppose they will eventually leave to have children by actually doing so). Neither do I
wish to essentialize women by suggesting that all women engage in caregiving. The
statistics merely reflect that caregivers as a group are doing poorly relative to other
employees, but since most caregivers are women, caregiving plays an important role how
women fare as a whole.
23. See generally Abrams, supra note 16, at 1611-14 (heralding a more nuanced and
contextualized treatment of caregiving in emerging feminist scholarship); Becker, supra
note 8, at 59-62 (describing the "new generation" of care theorists who argue that women
are disproportionately poor relative to men because their caregiving contribution to society
is undervalued).
24. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
25. See id. at 136.
26. The PDA is an amendment to Title VII which provides that discrimination on the
basis of "sex" includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. See 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e(k) (1994).
27. See Byrd v. Lakeshore Hosp., 30 F.3d 1380, 1383 (lth Cir. 1994) (finding
discrimination where pregnant employee who took sick leave was terminated while other
temporarily disabled or sick employees in similar positions were not); United States v. Bd.
of Educ., 938 F.2d 790, 798-99 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the employer's maternity leave
policy was discriminatory because it prohibited pregnant teachers from combining paid sick
leave with unpaid maternity leave but allowed non-pregnant sick teachers to do so).
28. Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Stout v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 860 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding no unlawful
discrimination because "[a]lthough [employer]'s policy results in the dismissal of any
pregnant or post-partum employee who misses more than three days of work during the
probationary period, it equally requires the termination of any non-pregnant employee who
misses more than three days"); Gorman v. Wells Mfg. Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 970, 980
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affirmative needs for benefits or leave related to pregnancy, a condition
that they alone experience and the results of which disadvantage only them,
irrespective of the unavailability of health care or leave for other
"disabilities" that men and women share.
The difficulties of applying formal equality principles in the
pregnancy context are more intractable with respect to caregiving that
arises outside the event of childbirth. The premise of Title VII is that
similarly situated employees should be treated equally and not on the basis
of immutable, protected characteristics such as race or gender. Pregnancy
challenges this premise because men and women cannot be similarly
situated with respect to that condition. In view of the fact that pregnancy is
"unique" (and temporary), courts have been willing to sanction special
treatment of pregnancy that might otherwise be viewed as antithetical to
equality principles. Thus, in Federal Savings & Loan v. Guerra, the
Supreme Court interpreted the PDA as permitting employers to provide
more generous leave to pregnant employees than to non-pregnant disabled
employees despite the plaintiffs' claim that the practice discriminated
against men.29 Caregiving is not amenable to the same judicial sleight of
hand. Both men and women are capable of providing care and performing
most other forms of family work.30 Employer consideration of a woman's
caregiving responsibilities in rendering personnel decisions is not
discrimination on the basis of sex, by definition, because caregiving, while
performed predominantly by women, is not an immutable characteristic
(S.D. Iowa 2002) (finding against pregnant employee fired for absenteeism related to her
pregnancy because she "failed to meet her burden to produce any evidence that similarly
situated non-protected class employees were treated more favorably than she").
29. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (concluding that the
PDA, while not requiring any accommodation of pregnancy, did not prohibit such
accommodations, thereby saving an employer from a finding that it had discriminated on the
basis of sex (in favor of women and to the detriment of men) by providing more generous
leave to pregnant employees than to non-pregnant disabled employees).
30. Perhaps the only exception is men's obvious inability to breastfeed infant children.
Scholars have argued that breastfeeding should be treated as an aspect of pregnancy and
consequently entitled to equivalent protection. See, e.g., Shana M. Christrup, Breastfeeding
in the American Workplace, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 471, 480-81 (2001);
Isabelle Schallreuter Olson, Out of the Mouths of Babes: No Mother's Milk for U.S.
Children: the Law and Breastfeeding, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 269, 302-03 (1995); Jendi B.
Reiter, Accommodating Pregnancy and Breastfeeding in the Workplace: Beyond the Civil
Rights Paradigm, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 19-20 (1999); Corey Silberstein Shdaimah, Why
Breastfeeding Is (Also) a Legal Issue, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 409, 420 (1999). Courts,
however, have generally not adopted this view. See, e.g., McNill v. New York City Dep't
of Corrs., 950 F. Supp. 564, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding employer justified in terminating
employee who requested accommodation of short breaks during the workday to breastfeed
her newborn); Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (noting
that breastfeeding is not a medical condition relating to childbirth and finding no
discrimination where employer denied female employee six week sick leave to wean infant
who, for medical reasons, could not bottle-feed).
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related to gender. Indeed, arguing otherwise risks re-entrenching existing
norms that shoulder women with the majority of caregiving work to their
ultimate disadvantage in the marketplace.
31
More problematic, however, is the controversial relationship between
caregiving and work performance. Discrimination law primarily targets the
irrational consideration of factors unrelated to an individual's qualifications
for work. While scholars dispute the extent to which women's caregiving
responsibilities affect employers' bottom line,32 at least in some instances,
women are hampered by caregiving in ways that non-caregivers (male and
female) are not in fulfilling common work obligations. Caregivers are less
likely to be able to work overtime, they may be unable to travel for
business for extended periods or at limited notice, and they are more likely
to be absent from work.33 The legal framework for assessing basic
discrimination claims accepts existing work requirements as the baseline
for evaluating performance and consequently views caregiving's impact on
performance as a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for an adverse
employment decision.34 Within this regime, if an employer can produce
31. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 221 (arguing that laws
designed to protect caregiving should be gender neutral because "[a] law that uses sex as a
proxy ... otherwise becomes [yet another] social sanction to police women back into the
caregiver role and men out of it"); Kessler, supra note 2, at 467 (warning that "[i]f women
assert that they deserve rights because gender socialization or biological forces dictate their
caregiving, they will receive rights only during the limited circumstances when society
considers their agency to be bounded").
32. Compare Selmi, supra note 5, at 745-46 (suggesting that disadvantageous treatment
of women is attributable more to employers' false perceptions about women's commitment
level than to any real effect of caregiving on women's work performance), with Issacharoff
& Rosenblum, supra note 22, at 2157 (suggesting that employing women who bear children
is necessarily costly for employers even if no paid leave is provided insofar as employer
must continue employment benefits, hire temporary replacements, and absorb costs resulting
from the interruption in performance).
33. See Case, supra note 9, at 1761 (citing evidence that working women with children
under the age of six are absent twice as often as men or workers without children); Joan
Williams, Symposium, From Difference to Dominance to Domesticity: Care as Work,
Gender as Tradition, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1441, 1471 (2001) (suggesting that 92% of
working mothers are unable to work the overtime required by most higher-paying jobs).
34. The basic proof structure for Title VII disparate impact claims comes from the
McDonnell Douglas-Hicks-Burdine trilogy of Supreme Court cases. See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-03 (1973); Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508-
12 (1993). Under these decisions, once the plaintiff sets forth a prima facie case of
discrimination (by showing that she was treated less favorably than a similarly situated male
employee), the burden shifts to the defendant employer to produce a legitimate non-
discriminatory explanation for the adverse conduct, which the plaintiff must disprove. See
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803-04; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509.
This means that an employer can successfully defend against a mother's claim of sexually
discriminatory termination by truthfully asserting that it fired the plaintiff for refusing to
work overtime despite the fact that she did so because of her caregiving responsibilities.
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evidence to support a business-related basis for its decision, for instance its
financial inability to allow extra time off for childrearing, the employee
cannot succeed unless she proves that the asserted reason is a pretext
masking animus toward women.
Such performance-based obstacles not only arise in the context of
"intentional" or disparate treatment-type discrimination claims but in the
"unintentional" discrimination or disparate impact context as well. The
success of a disparate impact claim rests on the plaintiffs ability to
demonstrate a statistical disparity in the representation of a particular class
of employees without regard to animus. 35  Such claims therefore are
uniquely situated to target systemic practices that work to exclude
women. 36  However, even where such exclusion is demonstrated,
employment practices that are supported by legitimate business reasons,
such as those related to productivity or cost, are not considered
discriminatory despite the fact that they disproportionately burden women
as a group.37 Thus, the effects of caregiving on women's performance,
evaluated against existing work requirements, pose significant hurdles to
success within a discrimination framework even where animus issues are
removed from the calculus.
35. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994) ("An unlawful employment practice
based on disparate impact is established . . . if a complaining party demonstrates that a
respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... "); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 430 (1971) ("Under [Title VII], practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.").
36. See Abrams, supra note 3, at 1226-27 (noting that disparate impact litigation could
target a variety of job criteria that prevent women from succeeding at work, including
stringent absenteeism limits and demanding travel and time commitment requirements);
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101
COLUM. L. REv. 458, 484-89 (2001) (discussing how developing disparate impact law may
be used to encourage employers to establish criteria for decision making and institute review
mechanisms to weed out systemic bias in subjective decision making processes).
37. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (1994) (plaintiff establishes a disparate
statistical impact where "the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is
job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity"); Chambers
v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 925, 950-51 (D. Neb. 1986) (finding no actionable
disparate impact in employer practice of terminating single pregnant women where practice
furthered club's goal of "fostering growth and maturity of young girls"); Personnel Adm'r.
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 265 (1979) (finding no disparate impact in state's use of
veterans preference in hiring as the practice was "justified as a measure designed to reward
veterans for the sacrifice of military service, to ease the transition from military to civilian
life, to encourage patriotic service, and to attract loyal and well-disciplined people to civil
service occupations"). See generally Abrams, supra note 3, at 1227-28 (explaining
business necessity defense and the difficulties of proof it presents for employees seeking to
attack barriers to successful employment of primary parents).
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B. "Equal Accommodation" of Caregiving
In light of the limitations of traditional discrimination law, focus has
shifted to accommodation and the potential for affirmative conduct that
will assist caregivers. The Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, the first and
only federal statute aimed at redressing work/family conflict, requires
employers to provide a fixed accommodation of twelve weeks unpaid leave
plus reinstatement to employees with particular family caregiving
responsibilities. 38 The statute recognizes that the lack of employer policies
to accommodate working parents requires legislative action establishing
minimum employer obligations, and it is one of very few federal
employment laws that grants substantive entitlements to certain terms of
employment.39
Contemporary political initiatives have typically built on FMLA
entitlements by calling for mandated accommodations beyond the leave
provided for by statute. Since its passage, the FMLA has been extensively
criticized for failing to sufficiently address women's caregiving needs.4 °
The Family and Medical Leave Improvements Act, introduced in Congress
in 1997, would have expanded the reach of the statute to require leave for
parents attending school-related events.4' Scholars have also called for
38. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 2612(a)-(c) (West Supp. 2003).
39. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601(1999 & Supp. 2003) (noting in preamble that "the lack of
employment policies to accommodate working parents can force individuals to choose
between job security and parenting"). Other minimum employment terms mandated by
federal laws are largely limited to the wage and hour requirements of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and work safety rules imposed by the Occupational Safety and Health Act.
See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1999) (establishing a minimum wage); Id. at § 207 (requiring
employers to pay one and a half times the regular rate of pay for every hour over forty
worked by an employee in one work-week); 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1998 & West Supp. 2003)
(making it illegal for employers to engage in oppressive child labor or knowingly trade with
others who employ oppressive child labor); 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1999 & West Supp. 2003)
(requiring employers to provide working conditions free from recognized hazards likely to
cause death or injury and to follow promulgated occupational safety and health standards).
40. The FMLA provides only unpaid leave for the discrete life events of birth, adoption,
and serious family illness and is therefore unhelpful to a large number of working
caregivers. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 2612(a)-(c) (West 1999 & Supp. 2003). Consequently,
scholarly critique of the statute's parsimonious benefits has become a cottage industry. See,
e.g., Bornstein, supra note 8, at 81 ("[B]y providing only emergency or short-term coverage
[in] gender-neutral language . . . the benefits provided by the Act are more symbolic
than they are real."); Rhode, supra note 8, at 845 (noting that "twelve weeks falls far short
of what child development experts believe is minimally necessary" for the amount of time a
mother should remain at home with her child after birth); Selmi, supra note 5, at 765-66
("[T]here is no indication that the FMLA has greatly, or even mildly, facilitated the
balancing of work and family commitments.").
41. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-109 (1997). The Family and Medical Leave Improvements
Act would have entitled employees to take FMLA leave to "participate in school activities
directly related to the educational advancement of a son or daughter of the employee, such
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increasing basic employee entitlements, for instance by requiring
employers to provide some amount of paid leave for FMLA qualifying
42events. 2 Others have suggested legislation requiring employers to
"reasonably accommodate" caregiving in the way that Title VII and the
Americans with Disabilities Act require reasonable accommodation of
religion and disability, respectively.43  Under such directives, employers
could be required to provide such accommodations as flexible work
schedules, on-site daycare, work sabbaticals, or other types of "family
friendly" work policies as appropriate to suit employees' individual
needs.44
Importantly, support for accommodation, whether in a legislatively
fixed or individually tailored form, has emerged despite the historical
divide between sameness and difference feminism. Accommodation has
avoided the pitfalls of this debate by distancing itself from the controversial
claim of preferential treatment for women. Instead of "special treatment"
for mothers, the pursuit of accommodation for caregiving seeks "equal
accommodation" of all workers. 45  The integrity of the FMLA and other
proposals that would mandate substantive benefits or require reasonable
as parent-teacher conferences or interviewing for a new school" and an additional twenty-
four hours of leave in any twelve-month period to "accompany the son or daughter of the
employee to routine medical or dental appointments, such as checkups or vaccinations."
See id. The bill also would have expanded the FMLA's coverage to include employers with
twenty-five or more employees. See id. The current law applies only to those with fifty or
more. 29 U.S.C. § 261 l(4)(A)(i).
42. See, e.g., Jeremy 1. Bohrer, Recent Development: You, Me, and the Consequences of
Family: How Federal Employment Law Prevents the Shattering of the "Glass Ceiling, " 50
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 401,420 (1996) (suggesting that employers pay at least a
portion of FMLA leave in order to accommodate those employees who could not otherwise
afford to take time off); Selmi, supra note 5, at 770-71 (recommending that federal law be
amended to require employers to pay six weeks of FMLA qualifying leave per worker).
43. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 2, at 457-59 (suggesting that the ADA and the
religious accommodation provisions of Title VII "offer promising models of substantive
equality on which to build a theory of workplace accommodation for family caregiving
responsibilities"); Peggie R. Smith, supra note 8, at 1445-73 (proposing a model of
employer accommodation of family caregiving that would follow the procedural framework
associated with religious accommodation claims under Title VII and rely on unemployment
compensation case law to determine when an employee has a compelling family obligation
that conflicts with work); see also Finley, supra note 16, at 1175-76 (urging that employers
bear the costs associated with workers' childbearing and childrearing needs).
44. See, e.g., Peggie R. Smith, supra note 8, at 1474-78 (suggesting possible workplace
accommodations for family caregivers, including granting lateral job transfers, facilitating
voluntary substitute and swap arrangements between co-workers, and permitting flexible
work schedules).
45. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 221 (arguing that laws
designed to protect caregiving should be gender neutral); Kessler, supra note 2, at 456-57
(urging that support for caregiver rights should be grounded in the need for a fully
functioning and lasting society so that both women and men will receive those rights
whenever they engage in caregiving).
Vol. 12:345
Accommodation Subverted
accommodation rests on applying those directives to both male and female
workers with children, as well as to male and female workers with family
caregiving responsibilities other than parenting. Indeed, the text of the
statute notes the importance of having both fathers and mothers participate
in childrearing and family caregiving, and scholars consistently contend
that men's assumption of family work is essential to eliminating women's
workplace disadvantage.46 In this way, work/family initiatives steer the
debate away from gender discrimination and toward the presumptively
gender-neutral issues of family life and health.
On a doctrinal level, accommodation and equality are increasingly
posited as equivalents in the realization of workers' civil rights. Such is the
case under the ADA, which treats the failure to accommodate disability as
a form of discrimination within a traditional equality framework. The
statute makes disability a protected characteristic, so that an adverse
employment decision based on prejudice or stereotype regarding the
disability is unlawful.47  Yet even where an employee's disability
legitimately impacts performance, the employer has no defense against a
differential treatment claim if the employer is capable of reasonably
accommodating the employee in a way that will enable him or her to
perform equally.48  Thus, an indefensible failure to act affirmatively
46. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601(a)(2) (1999 & Supp. 2003) (noting that "it is important for
the development of children and the family unit that fathers and mothers be able to
participate in early childrearing and the care of family members who have serious health
conditions"); Kessler, supra note 2, at 421 (criticizing men for not taking as large a role in
parenting as had been anticipated following the enactment of the FMLA); Martin H. Malin,
Fathers and Parental Leave Revisited, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 25, 26-27 (1998) (arguing that
children, mothers, and fathers benefit when fathers take part in the childrearing process and
advocating for changing the focus of workplace accommodations to include accommodating
the caregiving responsibilities of men); Selmi, supra note 5, at 777-78 (arguing that men
must take leave in order to disabuse employers of the notion that only women provide
caregiving which results in allegedly rational statistical discrimination against them).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1995); Samuel Issacharoff& Justin Nelson, Discrimination
with a Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with
Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307, 312-13 (2001) (noting that the "standard anti-
discrimination formula" for prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability under the
ADA was borrowed from the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Pamela S. Karlan & George
Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1,
5-6 (1996) (noting that six of the seven prohibitions under the ADA are "borrowed virtually
intact from the language of Title VII and case law, and their interpretation with respect to
claims by disabled individuals seems to flow directly from their interpretation in their
original context"); see also Michelle A. Travis, Leveling the Playing Field or Stacking the
Deck? The "Unfair Advantage" Critique of Perceived Disability Claims, 78 N.C. L. REV.
901, 904-05 (2000) [hereinafter Travis, Leveling the Playing Field] (noting that the ADA
protects individuals with disabilities from stereotypes, prejudice, and misperceptions).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1995) (The term "discriminate" includes "not making
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered
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substitutes for the invidious motivation associated with a traditional
equality claim.49
Recent scholarship has called into question the division between what
have historically been thought of as negative directives, like the operative
portions of Title VII, and the affirmative requirements imposed by the
accommodation-oriented statutes of the last decade.50 Christine Jolls has
argued that affirmative conduct and negative conduct are not distinct
categories, but rather lie on a continuum with "traditional" equality-based
discrimination laws and accommodation mandates at either end. 51
Professor Jolls focuses on Title VII disparate impact claims, which permit
employees to challenge practices that disproportionately impact protected
groups despite the absence of an intent to discriminate. In cases involving
employer grooming rules, English-only policies, and certain pregnancy
cases challenging limited leave policies, courts have required employers to
alter facially neutral practices supported by a business-related rationale.
52
entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business of such covered entity.").
49. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 47, at 10 (noting that "the ADA embraces
both a 'sameness' and a 'difference' model of discrimination); Travis, Leveling the Playing
Field, supra note 47, at 905 (suggesting that a reasonable accommodation right creates
equal opportunities by breaking down norms created by nondisabled workers and allowing
those with disabilities to compete on an equal playing field).
50. The argument that accommodation and equality directives embody fundamentally
distinct goals has been frequently asserted in scholarship comparing the entitlements
afforded under the ADA to the anti-discrimination prohibitions of Title VII. See, e.g.,
Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 47, at 310 (describing the ADA's accommodation
requirement as a "marked departure from [the nondiscrimination commands] of prior
employment law" in the form of required redistribution under the accommodation mandate);
Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 47, at 9 (explaining that Title VII holds employment
practices unlawful only when they prevent individuals from performing the job as the
employer defines it, whereas the ADA requires the employer to take positive steps to change
the job or work environment to meet the needs of eligible disabled employees); Peggie R.
Smith, supra note 8, at 1460 ("Whereas traditional anti-discrimination doctrine embodies a
negative concept of liberty understood as the right to be left alone, the accommodation
principle ... is premised on positive liberty, imposing upon employers an affirmative duty
to accommodate the needs of employees."); see also Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and
Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 643-44 (2001) (summarizing arguments that
because accommodation laws mandate special treatment for distinct groups they are
inconsistent with Title VII's requirement of equal treatment for all workers).
51. Jolls, supra note 50, at 644-45.
52. See, e.g., EEOC v. Trailways, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 54, 59 (D. Colo. 1981) (exempting
black employees from shaving despite employer's explanation that having clean shaven
employees is important to company image); Lanning v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d
478, 485, 491-94 (3d Cir. 1999) (disapproving a policy requiring employees to run 1.5
miles in twelve minutes because it disproportionately excluded women, despite recognition
of the employer's need to impose minimal physical standards on its officers); EEOC v.
Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 912-14 & n.7 (N.D. Il1. 1999) (finding
English only rule discriminatory); EEOC v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647, 651-55
(N.D. Ill. 1991) (finding employer policy of terminating any first-year employee requiring
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Implicit in the business rationale defense is the idea that the employer must
have a substantial interest in the objectionable practice to justify its
disparate effect and that a minor interest will not relieve an employer of
liability.53 Since the remedy in disparate impact cases may require the
employer to refrain from applying the objectionable practice to the
protected class, such rulings are in effect accommodation mandates-they
force the employer to confer benefits on or create exceptions for a
particular group of employees.54
Research specifically addressing caregiving and women's workplace
disadvantage has similarly collapsed the equality/accommodation
distinction. Joan Williams, in her numerous contributions to this area of
scholarship, has suggested that issues of systemic bias against women may
be attacked by reinterpreting basic equality rules to include analysis of
existing work structures.55 According to Professor Williams, jobs that
require full time hours plus overtime are designed based on a prototypical
male employee with no family responsibilities and in this way discriminate
against women who diverge from the "ideal worker" norm.56 In analyzing
disparate treatment as well as disparate impact claims, courts must
deconstruct employers' allegedly "legitimate" reasons for packaging work
in ways that disadvantage caregivers.57 Such a position does not demand
that the law place direct obligations on employers, but it in effect
incorporates an accommodation requirement by moving the baseline for
what courts may accept as neutral justifications for employer business
practices. Under this approach, the failure to reconsider and ultimately
alter work practices in response to changing workforce demographics
constitutes a form of unlawful discrimination against women, who serve as
the primary caregivers in most families.
Thus the concept of accommodating caregiving has been
mainstreamed. Under the FMLA, and in many proposals for additional
reform, caregiving benefits are framed as worker rights rather than
long-term sick leave disparately impacted women who could become pregnant despite the
employer's assertion that the policy reduced turnover). See generally Jolls, supra note 50, at
653-63 (summarizing these and other disparate impact cases in which courts have held
employers liable despite the presence of a legitimate business rationale for the challenged
job practice).
53. See generally Jolls, supra note 50, at 665-66.
54. See id. at 652.
55. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 213 (urging that the
ultimate goal of equality is to "deconstruct domesticity, and reconstruct market work and
family entitlements").
56. See id. at 1 (defining the "ideal worker" as one who "works full time and overtime
and takes little or no time off for childbearing or child rearing," in other words, the
traditional male employee).
57. See id. at 109 (arguing that the ability to work in an environment defined by and
structured around male bodies and norms cannot be a legitimate job qualification).
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preferential treatment for women. At the same time, employment
discrimination scholarship has emphasized the connection between equality
and accommodation concepts, creating the potential for greater support for
caregiving benefits, which can in turn address the problem of systemic
discrimination against women.
1II. Equal Accommodation in Action: Title VII's "Legitimate Non-
Discriminatory Reason" Defense Meets the Refusal to Accommodate
Claim
The previous section suggested that accommodation offers a unifying
and intellectually consistent framework for moving beyond formal equality
in addressing caregiving. Yet the convergence of equality and
accommodation brings together two very different regulatory approaches
with distinct practical effects that may pose difficulty in application.
Crucial to evaluating the potential for caregiving accommodation is
understanding where and how existing accommodation laws deviate in
application from their aspirational missions. Such deviations are inherent
in interpreting accommodation laws against a background regime in which
equality norms predominate.58 In evaluating refusal to accommodate
claims, courts frequently use the language of formal equality, emphasizing
the absence of animus and the viability of the employer's business
justification in limiting the reach of the law. Because the purpose of
accommodation is to move beyond issues of motivation and require
affirmative conduct, this injection of traditional Title VII defenses within
the accommodation framework seriously undermines the transformative
potential of the accommodation strategy.
The following section looks at two instances in which equality
prevails at the expense of accommodation, concluding that existing
jurisprudence does not embrace the type of aggressive changes to employer
behavior necessary to meaningfully support employee caregiving. The
subversive effects of equality have both a substantive and procedural
dimension. On the substantive side, courts have accepted the existing
structure of work as a baseline in delineating the extent of accommodation
required under the ADA, refusing to require systemic changes perceived to
benefit some workers over others. On the procedural side, courts have
placed the burden on employees to prove that a refusal to restore them to
their jobs under the FMLA was improperly motivated in order to obtain the
58. The interaction and counteraction between legal mandates and pre-existing human
forces has frequently been the subject of law and sociology scholarship. See Linda
Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. OF EMP. & LAB. L.
476, 492 (describing how social norms capture and assert themselves within laws designed
to transform them). I will return to this concept in more detail in Part IV.B.
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benefits mandated by the statute. These results suggest that rather than
raising the bar on what is considered equal employment opportunity,
accommodation has been held down by the more narrow view of equality
that it aims to overcome.
A. Delineating the Reach of Individualized Accommodation under the
Americans with Disabilities Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act is a particularly appropriate
source for examining the practical interaction between accommodation and
equality because it is a hybrid equality-accommodation statute. It provides
that no covered employer shall discriminate against a "qualified individual
with a disability", that is, a person who "with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position., 59 In defining discrimination, the statute provides that the failure
to make a reasonable accommodation that would enable an employee to
perform the job constitutes discrimination, unless the employer can prove
that doing so would be "unduly burdensome. 6°
As applied, however, the ADA has not effectuated wide-scale changes
in the structure of employment. While the ADA makes disability a
protected characteristic, it preserves performance-related disability as a
legitimate, "non-discriminatory" business concern. To bring an ADA
claim, an employee must establish the same prima facie case required of a
typical disparate-treatment plaintiff under an equal treatment model of
proof.6' The employee must show that she is a member of the protected
class (disabled), that she is a qualified individual, and that she was
subjected to an adverse employment decision.62 "Qualified individual," in
this context, is defined as "a person who can perform the essential
functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation." 63 Thus
the reasonableness of any accommodation and the question of the
legitimacy of any performance-related defense is embedded in the
threshold demonstration the plaintiff must sustain in order to insist on
affirmative employer conduct.
59. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West 1995 & Supp. 2003 IA), § 12112(a) (1995 & West
Supp. 2003 IA).
60. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (West 1995 & Supp. 2003 IA).
61. See, e.g., Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 750 (2d Cir. 2001); Walton
v. Mental Health Ass'n of S.E. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 667-68 (3d Cir. 1999); Mason v. United
Airlines, Inc., 274 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2001); Pugh v. City of Attica, 259 F.3d 619, 625-
26 (7th Cir. 2001); Lowery v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 244 F.3d 654, 657 (8th Cir. 2001).
62. See, e.g., Giordano, 274 F.3d at 747; Walton, 168 F.3d at 668; Aldrup v. Caldera,
274 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 2001); Pugh, 259 F.3d at 626; Lowery, 244 F.3d at 657; Snead
v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001).
63. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West 1995 & Supp 2003 IA).
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Cases demonstrate that in meeting these prerequisites, plaintiffs have
had only limited success in challenging existing work structures or position
requirements. This is surprising since, unlike Title VII, which examines
discrimination within a static work environment, the ADA contemplates
that courts will look beyond existing job structures and requirements in
evaluating the legitimacy of an asserted business-related basis for an
employment decision and, where reasonable, require employers to alter
practices that adversely affect disabled workers.6 4 In fact, the statute
expressly defines reasonable accommodation to include, among other
things, "job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, [and]
reassignments. 65  Yet most accommodations provided under the statute
tend to be modest and relatively inexpensive, such as the acquisition of
technology, the physical alteration of work equipment, or the hiring of a
reader or assistant.66 These accommodations affect the way in which the
employee performs the job but do not alter the core characteristics of the
position.
Requested accommodations that target more systemic obstacles to
disabled employees, such as work pace, bundling of job functions, and
hours and attendance requirements, have frequently been unsuccessful
where they touch on business judgment about the nature of work. For
instance, in cases involving overtime work, courts generally accept
employer assertions about the hours required to complete the job, treating
existing practices as a justification for the norm. The Washington Supreme
64. See Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 47, at 315 (noting that ADA imposes a duty to
alter the workplace environment even where disabled employee is not as productive as
nondisabled employee); Travis, Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 47, at 913 (noting the
focus of the ADA accommodation mandate is on alleviating the performance impact on
disabled employees caused by an operational environment modeled on the narrow
conception of a non-disabled employee).
65. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(9)(B) (West 1995 & Supp 2003 IA).
66. See Peter David Blanck, Transcending Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act: A Case Report on Sears, Roebuck and Co., 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP.
278, 278 (1996) (noting that between 1993 and 1996, 99% of accommodations required little
to no cost, 72% required no cost, 17% required less than $100, 10% required less than $500,
1% required more than $500, and the average cost was approximately $45); Mary L.
Dispenza, Note, Overcoming a New Digital Divide: Technology Accommodations and the
Undue Hardship Defense Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV.
159, 164 (2002) (noting that in the ten years since the passage of the ADA, the cost
associated with requested accommodations of assistive devices or changes in the physical
nature of the workplace environment has been modest); Keith Nelson, Comment,
Legislative and Judicial Solutions for Mental Health Parity: S. 543, Reasonable
Accommodation, and an Individualized Remedy under Title I of the ADA, 51 AM. U. L. REV.
91, 126 (2001) (providing examples of inexpensive accommodations such as construction of
a special platform for security personnel's better accessibility to television monitors, using
ergonomic furniture, providing chairs, and relocating an HIV infected worker to a mold-free
work environment).
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Court decision in Davis v. Microsoft Corp. provides a particularly lucid
example. 67 In that case the plaintiff was a systems engineer who regularly
worked between sixty and eight hours per week and was responsible for
two major clients.68 After being diagnosed with hepatitis C, he requested
an accommodation that would allow him to reduce his work-week to forty
hours per week in order to reduce stress and ensure adequate rest.69
Microsoft temporarily allowed Davis to drop one account, but ultimately
concluded it could not maintain the arrangement on a permanent basis
without hiring additional staff, an accommodation it deemed "not
reasonable.,
70
Davis brought a claim under the Washington equivalent of the ADA,
claiming that Microsoft failed to reasonably accommodate his disability by
refusing to allow him to continue working forty hours per week.7' The
court found against him, concluding that Davis was incapable of
performing the essential functions of the job.72 The court credited
Microsoft's defense that the extensive overtime Davis had formerly worked
was an essential function that Microsoft was not obligated to eliminate.73
Taking the existing work practices as its baseline, the court noted the
unrebutted evidence "that all systems engineers within the department had
consistently worked 60-80 hours per week for years. According to the
court:
Microsoft demonstrated that the structure of the position does not
lend itself to a regular, 40-hour work-week. Systems engineers
travel extensively and set up computer demonstrations under
deadlines. Problems frequently occur during the set-up process,
requiring the engineer to work long hours to ensure that the
computers are properly functioning in time for presentations.
Reasonable minds could not differ that overtime in the systems
engineer position were [sic] essential functions .. .
The court in no way questioned the wisdom of the employer's work
expectation or considered the norms that underlie an eighty-hour work
67. 37 P.3d 333 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
68. Id. at 335.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 335-36.
72. Id. at 337.
73. Davis, 37 P.3d at 337.
74. Id.
75. Id.; see also Davis v. Florida Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1305-06 (11th
Cir. 2000) (finding mandatory overtime work to be an essential function of the job and
denying employee's ADA claim where employer had a policy of processing all customer
orders within 24 hours and employee's coworkers worked an average of 216 overtime hours
each in the year preceding employee's termination).
2003
Texas Journal of Women and the Law
week, a requirement that would systematically exclude employees with any
number of disabilities.
Similar resistance is apparent in cases involving requests to eliminate
or reduce the intensity of job demands other than hours. Courts generally
find that employers need neither reduce standards to accommodate
disability, where such standards are selected for business reasons, nor
reallocate job functions in a manner that would require additional staff or
add responsibilities to other employees. In Milton v. Scrivner, for instance,
the plaintiff-employees were grocery selectors whose jobs consisted
primarily of taking orders and moving merchandise within a warehouse.76
When the company implemented new production standards, the plaintiffs
were unable to perform to pace as a result of previously sustained work-
place injuries and were terminated by the company. 77 The Tenth Circuit
concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under the ADA.7 8
Citing evidence that the new production standards had been implemented
"to improve Scrivner's competitiveness" and were "aimed at increasing
efficiency and productivity," the court concluded that the ability to meet
the new productions standards imposed by the company was an essential
function of the job.79 Because these standards applied uniformly to all
employees in the plaintiffs' position, the plaintiffs were deemed unentitled
to any deviation in standards.80 The court refused to second-guess the
employer's determination of the content, nature, and functions of the job.8'
The point here is not that these decisions are wrongly decided, for
indeed they are consistent with current law. In considering an
accommodation approach to caregiving, however, such cases serve to
highlight the difficulty of effecting meaningful changes in work
environment notwithstanding the existence of an affirmative mandate. On
its surface, the ADA embodies a commitment to accommodation that could
revolutionize employers' treatment of caregivers if transported to that
context. A statute that by its terms contemplates accommodation through
job restructuring and modified work schedules could conceivably challenge
features of work rooted in the "ideal worker" norm and demand employer
flexibility in the areas that most disadvantage caregivers. Such an
approach could eliminate the performance impact defense to terminating or
refusing to hire caregivers that would pertain under a traditional
discrimination analysis. Yet despite the ADA's accommodation mandate,
courts are reluctant to allow plaintiffs to deviate from an existing norm that
76. Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1119-20 (10th Cir. 1995).
77. Id. at 1120.
78. Id. at 1121.
79. Id. at 1124.
80. Id.
81. id.
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other employees have maintained, and they tend to retreat to equality
principles in the face of what would otherwise be legitimate reasons for
employer adverse action.
B. Establishing Entitlement to Mandated Benefits under the Family
Medical Leave Act
That court application of accommodation under the ADA fails to
realize the statute's potential is perhaps unsurprising in light of the
individualized nature of the required accommodation. By mandating only
affirmative conduct that is "reasonable," the statute invites interpretation
that will necessarily reflect dominant norms and expectations about work.82
An alternative vehicle for requiring accommodation is substantive benefit
legislation that sets out specific employer obligations designed to address
workplace disadvantage. It is this approach that has been adopted in
addressing work/family balance under the Family Medical Leave Act.
Of course, the accommodation provided by the FMLA is a limited
one. The product of significant political compromise,83 the FMLA
provides only unpaid leave and offers no additional assistance or benefits
other than the continuation of health care coverage, for which the employee
must pay.84 For this reason, FMLA leave has benefited only a small
portion of those employees who experience qualifying events. 85 These
82. The amorphous nature of the requirement also makes compliance difficult for
employers and creates uncertainty that encourages costly litigation. See Issacharoff &
Nelson, supra note 47, at 339 (noting that the ADA accommodation requirement calls for an
individualized inquiry into the abilities of each employee and his or her actual job
demands).
83. See Carolyn Lochhead, House Passes Family Leave by 102 Votes/GOP Senators
Threaten to Stall by Linking it to Gays in the Military, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 4, 1993, at AI
(describing partisan tension in Congress over passage of family leave bill); William J.
Kilberg, The Clinton Administration Labor Agenda, 18 EMP. REL. L.J. 543, 543-45 (1993)
(noting that the FMLA was vetoed twice by President George H. W. Bush before being
signed into law by President Clinton in 1994). For a history of the Act's passage, see
generally RONALD D. ELVING, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: How CONGRESS MAKES THE
LAW (1995).
84. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 2612(c) (1999 & Supp. 2003) (allowing employer to provide
unpaid leave); id. at § 2614(c)(1) (requiring only that employer retain employee's health
care coverage during leave and providing that employee must continue to bear expenses for
benefits that he or she paid for while working). The mandated allowance under the FMLA
replicates what many employers had voluntarily provided to employees prior to the Act's
passage through sick leave, parental leave programs, and temporary disability plans. See
generally Selmi, supra note 5, at 762-63.
85. See COMMISSION ON FAMILY & MED. LEAVE, A WORKABLE BALANCE: REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE POLICIES 88 (1996), available at
http://www.dol/esa/regs/compliance/whd/fmla/family.htm (last visited July 19, 2002)
[hereinafter A WORKABLE BALANCE] (reporting that out of the 55% of covered and eligible
employees, only 2% took leave under the FMLA between 1995 and 1996); Rhode, supra
2003
Texas Journal of Women and the Law
employees are likely to be white-collar, married women whose income is
secondary to a male breadwinner who maintains primary responsibility for
the family's financial support.86 Neither does that statute address the full
range of caregiving responsibilities that employees coping with childbirth
or serious family illness are likely to experience. An employee who returns
from FMLA leave following the birth of a child is not entitled to any
accommodation to assist her in balancing her job and the care of a three-
month-old infant.
87
That FMLA benefits are relatively modest is understandable given that
the statute represents a first effort to address caregiving and considering the
equality-based concerns that arise from any government initiative that
provides assistance to some individuals but not to others. The adoption of
substantive benefits legislation in this area retains important symbolic and
precedential value and has provided crucial job protection to at least a
subset of workers coping with qualifying events.88 What is more troubling
note 8, at 845 (suggesting that only 7% of eligible employees actually take FMLA leave
largely due to the fact that workers cannot afford the loss of pay); Selmi, supra note 5, at
764 (summarizing studies suggesting that utilization of FMLA leave at covered workplaces
is below 4%). The statute's worker eligibility requirements and definition of covered
employers also significantly limits the availability of leave. See Selmi, supra note 5, at
760-61 (noting that roughly 66% of the workforce is covered by the FMLA with
approximately 55% of employees eligible to take leave) (citing A WORKABLE BALANCE,
supra).
86. See Peggie R. Smith, supra note 8, at 1452-55 (suggesting that women in dual
income families are more likely to leave work to care for a child than single women who
cannot afford unpaid leave); cf Tamar Lewin, Men Assuming Bigger Share at Home, New
Survey Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1998, at A 18 (reporting results of polls demonstrating
that over four-fifths of mothers in dual-income families say that they are more likely to be
the parent to take time off of work to care for a child).
87. See Bornstein, supra note 8, at 81 ("[B]y providing only emergency or short-term
coverage . . . [in] gender-neutral language . . . the benefits provided by the [FMLA] are
more symbolic than they are real."); Rhode, supra note 8, at 845 (noting that "twelve weeks
falls short of what child development experts believe is minimally necessary" for the
amount of time a mother should remain at home with her child after birth); Selmi, supra
note 5, at 765-66 (asserting that "there is no indication that the FMLA has greatly, or even
mildly, facilitated the balancing of work and family commitments"); Williams, Our
Economy of Mothers and Others, supra note 8, at 430 (critiquing the FMLA for
"account[ing] for only three months of child-rearing, a task that lasts twenty years"); see
also Malin, supra note 5, at 53-54 (arguing that FMLA coverage should extend for a
reasonable time under the circumstances, rather than terminating the moment the
employee's qualifying event ends).
88. See Donna Lenhoff & Claudia Withers, Implementation of the Family and Medical
Leave Act: Toward the Family-Friendly Workplace, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 39, 39-40
(1994) (describing the FMLA as "a major milestone in the legal support of family life
because it explicitly recognizes that family life events have an impact on the workplace, and
requires the workplace to accommodate these events-albeit in a fairly modest way");
Peggie R. Smith, supra note 8, at 1443 (noting that the FMLA has served as a "safety net"
for at least some employees). But see Selmi, supra note 5, at 766 (noting the danger that the
passage of weak federal legislation may lead states to remove family leave issues from their
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is the way in which courts have retreated from accommodation principles
in applying the statute and interpreting the crucial reinstatement right.
While the statute appears to create a substantive right to job reinstatement,
courts have limited that entitlement by placing a burden on the plaintiff to
prove a discriminatory denial of reinstatement akin to demonstrating
animus under Title V11.
89
Analyzing the role of traditional equality principles in the application
of the FMLA requires some initial exposition of its legislative provisions.
With respect to reinstatement, the statute provides that any employee who
takes family medical leave must be restored to his or her position or an
equivalent position upon the expiration of the leave.90 Because qualifying
employees receive no pay, this guarantee is the principal benefit afforded
under the statute. However, the right to reinstatement is qualified. The
restored employee is not entitled to "any right, benefit, or position of
employment other than any right, benefit, or position to which the
employee would have been entitled had the employee not taken the
leave." 91 The interpretative regulations explain that the employer may
deny reinstatement to an employee on FMLA leave if that employee would
have been terminated or her job eliminated had she continued working.92
Some courts have interpreted this statutory language as a requirement
that the employee prove an unlawful motivation for the employer's denial
of reinstatement, an approach inconsistent with the substantive entitlement
created by the statute and its interpretative regulations.93  This confusion
among courts as to the procedural implications of the reinstatement
limitation stems from the fact that the FMLA contains both an anti-
legislative agenda and stymie private efforts to obtain stronger benefits for caregivers).
89. Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1016, n.10 (7th Cir. 2000).
90. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2614(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1999) ("[A]ny eligible employee who takes leave
under section 102 for the intended purpose of the leave shall be entitled, on return from such
leave (A) to be restored by the employer to the position of employment held by the
employee when the leave commenced; or (B) to be restored to an equivalent position with
equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.").
91. Id. at § 2614(a)(3)(B).
92. 29 C.F.R. § 825.216 (2001) ("If an employee is laid off during the course of taking
FMLA leave and employment is terminated, the employer's responsibility to continue
FMLA leave, maintain group health plan benefits and restore the employee cease at the time
the employee is laid off.").
93. See, e.g., Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., L.L.C., 277 F.3d 757, 768-69 (5th Cir.
2001); Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1017 (7th Cir. 2000). This allocation
of proof contradicts the Department of Labor regulations interpreting the reinstatement
limitation. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.216 (2001) ("An employer would have the burden of
proving that an employee would have been laid off during the FMLA leave period and,
therefore, would not be entitled to restoration."); see also Malin, supra note 5, at 50
(asserting that the purpose of the FMLA's reinstatement guarantee and the legislative
history of the Act indicate that the proviso regarding employees who would otherwise have
been terminated creates an affirmative defense which the employer must prove).
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retaliation provision and a non-interference directive. Section 105(a)(1)
prohibits employers from interfering with, denying, or restraining
employee rights to these benefits.94 Section 105(a)(2) makes it unlawful
for an employer to "discharge or in any other manner discriminate against
any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful" under the Act.95
While the latter section, read literally, applies only to oppositional conduct,
courts have interpreted the section to prohibit any form of retaliation
against employees who utilize or qualify for benefits under the statute.
96
Thus, an employee's claim of refusal to reinstate could be understood
either as a charge that the employer unlawfully denied or interfered with a
substantive entitlement or as a charge that the employer discriminated
against the employee by refusing reinstatement on the basis of an unlawful
motive. 97
The conflicting implications of this distinction can be seen in the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc. There, the
plaintiff took a seven-week FMLA qualifying leave as a result of a serious
health condition. 98 Two days after indicating her intent to return to work,
her employer informed her that she would be laid off as of her targeted
return date, claiming a need to reduce staff as a result of a decrease in
business and a simultaneous computer upgrade. 99 The employer argued
that Rice had been selected for layoff over other clerks because she
94. Id. at § 2615(a)(1) (1999 & Supp. 2003).
95. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2615(a)(2) (1999 & Supp. 2003).
96. See, e.g., Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., L.L.C., 277 F.3d 757, 768-71 (5th Cir.
2001) (evaluating employee's claim based on reassignment to a part-time shift position
following her return from FMLA leave under the anti-retaliation provisions of the Act);
Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 798-800 (1Ilth Cir. 2000) (treating
employee's allegation that she was terminated as a result of her request for FMLA leave as a
retaliatory discharge claim); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2002) ("An employer is
prohibited from discriminating against employees or prospective employees who have used
FMLA leave . . . [and] cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in
employment actions .... ").
97. See generally Michael L. Murphy, Note, The Federal Courts' Struggle with Burden
Allocation for Reinstatement Claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act: Breakdown
of the Rigid Dual Framework, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 1081, 1084-85 (2001) (explaining the
two alternative ways that courts have characterized failure to reinstate claims). Because the
claims so closely resemble one another, courts often determine which analysis to apply
based on how the pleadings are drafted or on superficial factual distinctions such as the
timing of termination. Compare Weston-Smith v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 282 F.3d
60, 62 (1st Cir. 2002) (framing claim as retaliation where employer terminated plaintiff
upon her return to work) with Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1017 (7th Cir.
2000) (framing claim as interference where plaintiff terminated while still on leave). See
also Murphy, supra at 1118-19 (noting that cases with identical facts "can be treated as
either a denial of a substantive right, retaliation, or both, depending on the form and content
of the pleading and the way the court decides to view it").
98. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1011.
99. Id.
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"wasted time taking smoke breaks, playing computer games, and talking on
the telephone."100 Rice, however, had never been disciplined, reprimanded,
or warned during her two-year employment with the company, and other
employees, including one owner, testified that her work performance was
satisfactory.10' Rice also asserted that one owner told her she had been
selected for layoff because she was "already off."'0 2
On appeal from a verdict for the plaintiff, the employer claimed that
the district court improperly instructed the jury that the employer had the
burden of establishing that Rice would have been laid off even if she had
not been on FMLA leave. 10 3 The Seventh Circuit agreed, holding that the
plaintiff must prove she would have retained her position had she not been
on leave. In so doing, the court lifted the shifting burden-of-proof structure
associated with the proof of garden-variety discrimination claims under
Title VII. It held that once the employer produces evidence that the benefit
in question would not have been available had the plaintiff continued
working, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving that the
employer's characterization is "insufficient" and that her FMLA leave is
the real reason for the termination.'
0 4
This interpretation of the burden-of-proof implications of the
reinstatement limitation contradicts the statute's accommodation-oriented
approach to caregiving. The essence of substantive benefit legislation is
that it places an affirmative obligation on the employer such that the failure
to provide the benefit is actionable regardless of motive. While the Rice
court appeared to distinguish between denial of rights claims and equality-
based assertions of unlawful retaliation, 0 5 it proceeded to conflate those
analyses by forcing the parties to a showdown on the issue of animus.
10 6
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. The jury was instructed that "a defendant is entitled to seek to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the employee would have been laid off during the
period of her FMLA leave, even if she had not taken such leave." Rice v. Sunrise Express,
Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1016, n.10 (7th Cir. 2000).
104. Id.
105. See id. at 1016-17 (distinguishing between 105(a)(1) and (a)(2) claims and
characterizing the plaintiffs claim as alleging interference with FMLA rights under the
former provision).
106. See Malin, supra note 5, at 51 ("The issue under the FMLA is not whether an
employee returning from leave was the victim of discrimination .... Rather the issue [is]
whether the plaintiff [has] been restored to her former job or an equivalent position.").
Professor Malin has argued that the FMLA is "modeled on section 8(a)(1) of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) which prohibits employer interference, restraint or coercion"
of employees' exercise of rights to organize or engage in other concerted activities. See id.
at 52; 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(1); cf Murphy, supra note 97, at 1127 (suggesting that the
FMLA resembles the Fair Labor Standards Act, which permits both a claim for deprivation
of substantive entitlements, such as overtime pay, and a claim for retaliation based on the
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The criticisms here do not concern the substance of the statutory
limitation against restoring employees whose jobs were genuinely
eliminated, but rather call into question the way in which that provision is
applied. In Rice, the Seventh Circuit in effect resurrects the legitimate non-
discriminatory reason defense that informs most of Title VII analysis,
forcing the plaintiff to prove pretext in response to a denial of benefits.
The practical implications of that approach can be severe, as the facts in
Rice suggest. Disputes about the reason for an employer's denial of
reinstatement will frequently be the central issue in an FMLA claim and
without a more favorable proof allocation, the non-interference provision
of the statute will offer little protection to employees seeking to exercise
FMLA rights.'0 7 Since it is the employer whose motivation is at issue, it is
the employer who is privy to the answer and the evidence needed to prove
it.108 This is equally true in Title VII claims in which the plaintiff bears the
burden of proof, but in the discrimination context, there is no reason to
assume an employer will base decisions on gender, race, or another
immutable characteristic. 0 9 In a family leave situation, on the other hand,
there are many reasons why an employer would be inclined to eliminate an
employee on leave, either because of convenience, because the employee's
absence indicates she is expendable, or because the employer fears the
employee will have ongoing family responsibilities that will impact her
work."10 The significance of the FMLA reinstatement requirement is that it
grants the employee an unequivocal benefit not conditioned on motive. By
placing the burden on the employee to disprove the employer's basis for its
decision, the court undercuts the very advantage that an accommodation
approach intends to create.
Thus the legitimate non-discriminatory-reason defense to adverse
employer behavior lives on in the realm of accommodation. By their terms
exercise of statutory rights). I discuss the implications of this comparison and Professor
Malin's particular recommendations in greater detail in Part V.B. 1, infra.
107. See Malin, supra note 5, at 52 (observing that "[r]equiring plaintiffs who are denied
their restoration rights to prove discrimination will do exactly what Congress sought to
prevent: it will deter employees from taking family leave out of fear for the security of their
jobs").
108. See Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1019 (7th Cir. 2000) (Evans, J.,
dissenting) ("On a practical level, it makes sense to require the employer to bear the burden
of proof on [the denial of reinstatement] issue. The employer is in control of the
evidence.").
109. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women's Equality, 90 CAL. L. REV.
735, 749 (2002) (suggesting that discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or similar
characteristics, as opposed to other forms of differential treatment, may be conclusively
presumed irrational).
110. Cf Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 22, at 2191-92 (suggesting that the
prospect of women's need for family leave and the costs it may entail creates an incentive
for employers to discriminate against women in the hiring stage).
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and intent both the ADA and FMLA are accommodation statutes that
require employer action that might otherwise contradict business judgment:
Employers must suffer the cost and inconvenience involved in holding a
position open for a caregiver on leave or altering the work environment to
allow a disabled individual to perform. On an aspirational level, such
redistributive aims are consistent with a vision of "true equality" in which
employees of different classes and with different needs have the same
ability to access and maintain employment in the manner enjoyed by
mainstream workers. In practice, however, equality and accommodation
do not always complement one another. Like the sketch of an old/young
woman invoked in the introduction to this paper, equality and
accommodation share the same space and operate along the same lines, but
they form different pictures. In other words, the same statutory language
can enforce formal equality or effect affirmative accommodation, but the
results will be different depending on which strategy ultimately prevails.
IV. Why Not Accommodate? Social Welfare and Workplace Culture in a
"Me, Inc." World
The emergence of accommodation within the statutory canon has had
a real, albeit modest, impact on the lives of some protected workers, and it
has had important consciousness-raising effects. However, the previous
section's examples of judicial interpretation of existing laws suggest that
deference to business judgment, a common feature of court decisions
rendered in access-oriented equality claims, continues to assert itself within
the accommodation regime. As a consequence, accommodation laws have
not significantly altered dominant work structures or norms. This bodes
poorly for accommodation of caregiving, which would require changes in
such systemic features of work as the forty-hour work-week, mandatory
overtime, and required travel.
The following section seeks to better understand the relationship
between the resistance to accommodation exhibited in the case law and the
ongoing call from scholars and activists for greater employer
accommodation of caregiving by setting the problem within a social
context. The desirability of employer-supported accommodation rests on
two assumptions: (i) basic features of the contemporary workplace
represent choices about work structure that can and should be changed; and
(ii) it is reasonable to expect employers to absorb the costs associated with
making those changes or with providing necessary benefits to employee
caregivers.
These assumptions are complex by any standard, but they appear
especially problematic when examined against the history of government
intervention in the workplace and the nature of modern employment
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relationships. This section begins by examining voluntarily-provided
employer benefits, which have been the dominant mode of addressing
employee lifecycle needs for the majority of the twentieth century. Such an
allocation of rights and responsibilities at work was enabled by a particular
"social contract" of employment, one in which employers and employees
anticipated a long-term symbiotic relationship often governed by a
collective bargaining agreement. In contrast, today's work relationships
are defined by a "Me, Inc." work culture-an employment environment in
which workers are increasingly independent, short-term employment
relationships predominate, collective action is all but absent, and employer
reliance on contingent labor has dramatically expanded. In an economy
where employees' futures depend not on their current employer but on the
value of their human capital within the external labor market, the incentives
for voluntary accommodation of employees' lifecycle needs are generally
absent.
These changes at work complicate the call for employer
accommodation of caregiving. To the extent that private mechanisms have
failed to adequately respond to workers' needs, it is tempting to fill the gap
with government mandates. But that top-down approach shows insufficient
consideration for contemporary expectations about the way people work.
The emerging "Me, Inc." workplace makes it harder, not easier, for
employers (and employees) to relinquish the particular structures that are
most detrimental to caregivers, and it creates an environment where
tensions between "ideal workers" and those with caregiving needs are
likely to be exacerbated. The imposition of extensive employer-funded
accommodation in this context may overreach and spawn backlash. The
following section explores these issues and attempts to provide a realistic
evaluation of the potential for accommodation in the current work culture.
A. Welfare Capitalism and the Role of Private Benefits
The focus on employer accommodation of caregiving in addressing
work/family conflict flows naturally from the historical treatment of social
welfare issues in the United States. Voluntarily-provided employment
benefits preceded significant governmental involvement in citizen welfare
and have played an ongoing role in shaping American public policy. Prior
to the passage of social security legislation in 1935, government welfare
initiatives were limited primarily to poverty relief administered at the local
level. l' Public assistance was viewed as charity and, accordingly,
stigmatized." 2 Consistent with the ideology of the industrial age, it was
11. See generally NICHOLAS BARR, THE EcoNoMics OF THE WELFARE STATE 28 (3d ed.
1998).
112. See id. (observing that public assistance eligibility generally required the recipient
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thought that every able-bodied (and implicitly male) person should be
capable of providing for himself.
As a result, companies rather than the federal government took the
lead in establishing safety-net programs for employees. By the turn of the
twentieth century, America had become an industrial society in which
many businesses and manufacturing industries were operating in an
expanded or national market." 13  Inspired by both benevolence and
pragmatism, leading capitalists initiated programs and institutions, ranging
from profit-sharing to the creation of company towns, in an effort to
accommodate the life needs of their employees. 14 While some of these
leaders were influenced by communitarian visions of industrial society,
ultimately they were motivated by the desire to foster peaceful working
relationships." 15 In the late 1880s, brief but severe periods of economic
depression and worker unrest contributed to an increasingly organized
labor movement.1 16  Private social welfare programs were a means of
stimulating productivity and worker loyalty; consequently, they could help
prevent work stoppages and forestall unionization.
"Welfare capitalism" was thus the logical outgrowth of 1 9th-century
ideology, an increasingly industrialized economy, and a laissez faire
government. In the 1930s, the Great Depression forced the federal
government to reconsider its role in citizen welfare; however, the private
model for delivering services and benefits had already been established.
Consequently, the Social Security Act took an employment-centered
approach to welfare." 7  Outside the exceptional situation of a citizen
to take the pauper's oath and resulted in disenfranchisement in many states).
113. See EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ & KIM MCQUAID, CREATING THE WELFARE STATE: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 20TH-CENTURY REFORM 11-12 (rev. ed. 1992) (noting how
localized and informal mechanisms of providing social services were ill-equipped to
respond to welfare needs of workers in a nationally-integrated industrial market).
114. See id. at 14-29 (describing efforts of industrial pioneers Nelson Olsen Nelson,
Edward Filene, and Henry Dennison in establishing cooperative communities for
employees).
115. See id. at 14-16 (noting that "these earliest benevolent 'feudalisms' owed little to
philanthropy and even less to ideology," but rather were aimed at keeping workers happy
and productive for the benefit of the employer's bottom line); Mary E. O'Connell, On the
Fringe: Rethinking the Link Between Wages and Benefits, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1421, 1428
(1993) (discussing how benevolent employers considered themselves morally obligated to
provide for their factory workers the way landowners in the previous agricultural economy
were expected to provide for agrarian laborers).
116. See BERKOWITZ & MCQUAID, supra note 113, at 13 (noting that over 10,000
American industrial plants were subject to labor strikes during this time period, three times
as many as had occurred in the preceding five years).
117. See Katherine V. W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 533 (2001)
(suggesting that public benefits structure reinforced the prevailing internal labor market
system in which employees tended to remain with a single employer on whom they
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incapable of self-support, benefits were based on the amount of each
individual's workforce participation." 8 Both social security retirement and
unemployment compensation were funded through payroll contributions;
the Act did not provide for supplementation from general federal
revenues." 9 The structure embodied the prevailing idea that social welfare
was not an entitlement but should be earned through reciprocal
contributions to the market system. 20  It also reflected a sentiment of
voluntarism, preferring private initiatives coupled with a minimal and
decentralized public presence, to a comprehensive federally-controlled
welfare system. 121
This allocation of responsibility for workers' extra-employment needs
between the government and the private sector remained largely unchanged
during the 2 0 th century. Other than the adoption of Medicaid and Medicare
in 1965, growth in government provision of social welfare benefits, both
through Social Security and other federally administered programs to date,
has been modest at best.' 22 In contrast, voluntary adoption of non-cash
benefits as a form of employment compensation expanded exponentially
during the 1940s and has continued to grow until recently.' 2 3 These
depended for compensation and welfare benefits throughout their lives).
118. The original Social Security Act established three programs: retirement benefits,
unemployment compensation to workers based on labor market earnings, and assistance to
impoverished dependent children-the precursor to Aid to Families with Dependent
Children. See 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1999) (retirement benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 501 et seq.
(1999) (unemployment compensation); 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1999) (assistance to
impoverished children.
119. See generally Ann Shola Orloff, The Political Origins of America ' Belated Welfare
State, in THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 40 (Margaret Weir, et al.
eds., 1988) (describing program structure).
120. See O'Connell, supra note 115, at 1434-35 (noting that despite the fact that the
collection of contributions and dispensation of benefits occurred through public channels,
the private sector set wages and the extent of wage-earning labor market participation was
the key determinant of the recipient's benefit entitlement); Amy Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare
Program, 8 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 477, 479-80 (2001) (describing operative norm of self-
reliance under which society expects able-bodied persons to support themselves and receive
assistance only when necessary and only after having previously contributed to the
collective).
121. See BARR, supra note 11l, at 41 (describing the American system as based on a
"residual" welfare model in which government intervention only occurs when market or
family breaks down); O'Connell, supra note 115, at 1433 (noting that voluntary welfare
programs were deemed superior to public programs because government action is associated
with compulsion while private activities are viewed as a matter of choice).
122. The Social Security Act was amended in 1939 to include survivors and dependents
of workers as beneficiaries. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-410a (1999). It was again amended in
1956 to provide for disability coverage. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 420-33 (1999).
123. BETH STEVENS, COMPLEMENTING THE WELFARE STATE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PRIVATE PENSION, HEALTH INSURANCE AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED
STATES 24 (1986) (noting that by 1982, 97% of employees of medium and large employers
had health insurance, 96% had life insurance, and 84% had pensions).
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developments are attributable to a combination of historical factors,
including wartime fiscal policies, an increase in private collective
bargaining, and dominant work norms that viewed employment as a long-
term symbiotic relationship. At the outset of World War II, faced with a
sudden labor shortage, the federal government set out to prevent inflation
by limiting wage increases and taxing excess corporate profit. 124 But in so
doing, it created incentives for employers to provide extra compensation to
workers in the form of non-cash benefits, which were not subject to the
wage limit and would in turn limit the companies' taxable profits. Not
surprisingly, by 1950 the number of workers covered by employer-
provided health insurance had multiplied almost twelve times the number
covered prior to World War II, from 5.6 million to just below 60 million,
and the number of workers covered by employer pension plans more than
doubled. 2 5  Unions in particular were quick to see the advantages of
negotiating for non-cash benefits, which would create positive results for
their constituencies despite the absence of meaningful wage increases;
therefore, benefits became a standard feature of collective bargaining
agreements. 126
The 1940s and 1950s also saw the height of a unique social contract
of employment that significantly contributed to the idea that employee
social welfare was appropriately addressed through private channels.
12 7
Employers' and employees' expectations of their relationship in the mid-
twentieth century grew out of the management and human resources
theories of the previous generation. Beginning with Frederick Taylor's
theory of scientific management in the 1910s, early industrial engineers
advocated for a highly systemized approach to labor organization
characterized by sharply differentiated jobs within a hierarchical structure
124. Id. at 18-19 (describing programs instituted by the National War Labor Board to
maintain a steady economy and good working relationships between employers and
employees). See O'Connell, supra note 115, at 1437-38 (describing effects of the Revenue
Act of 1942, which imposed an 80% tax on corporate profits).
125. STEVENS, supra note 124, at 23.
126. See id.
127. The term "social contract" is used here to refer not to an employment contract in the
legal sense, but rather to the mutual expectations of the parties, what is sometimes called the
"psychological contract" of employment. See Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for
Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in
Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163, 1200-01 (2001); Stone, supra note
117, at 549-50 (explaining that most employees have a psychological bond with their
employer based on mutual obligations that are usually implicit, covertly held, and rarely
discussed). While there is no legal mechanism for enforcing such understandings, parties
tend to comply with them. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability
of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1917 (1996) (noting
that companies often retain long-term employees and limit termination to for-cause
situations although they have the legal right to fire workers at will); infra Part IV.B.
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of advancement and promotion. 128 Jobs tended to be low skill and
repetitive, and workers were relatively dependent on management for
internal firm-specific training.' 29  To combat the inevitable problem of
turnover and low morale, employers compensated by promising long-term
job security, providing progressive wage increases, and offering extra-wage
benefits and services. 130  Workers who performed adequately and
consistently according to pre-designated standards could look forward to
consistent employment and rising pay. Both employees and employers
envisioned a fair exchange of long-term holistic compensation for long-
term loyal work.
By the 1940s and 1950s unions had adopted this symbiotic vision of
the workplace and molded their agenda accordingly. 13 1 Discrete job
categories and defined career ladders ensured reliable work and protected
against excessive employer demands and cross-utilization of workers.' 32 A
particular social contract of employment solidified, guided by the idea that
employment relationships should withstand the various human and
economic changes that occur over the course of an employee's life. The
result was a developing cultural expectation that employers were the
appropriate party to insure against an employee's lifecycle needs by
providing health care coverage, disability benefits, life insurance, pensions,
and other benefits in exchange for reliable work.
B. Employer Incentives in an External Labor Market
In many respects, caregiving benefits are comparable to other forms of
social welfare historically provided to workers by their employers.
Caregiving is an inevitable part of an employee's lifecycle, even among
128. See PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK: MANAGING THE MARKET-DRIVEN
WORKFORCE 59-64 (1999) (describing characteristics of labor management systems initiated
by Henry Ford and Frederick Taylor during mid-twentieth century that were characterized
by strong centralized management, pay schemes determined by seniority and defined
performance measures, regimented job hierarchies, and a culture of promotion from within);
Stone, supra note 117, at 529-32 (describing "scientific management" approach to labor
management as based on three principles: (1) taking knowledge away from workers and
locating it in management; (2) finding and enforcing the "one best way" to approach any
task through time and motion studies; and (3) establishing defined career ladders with
limited ports of entry).
129. See Amow-Richman, supra note 127, at 1199; Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in
Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 100 (2003); Stone, supra note 117, at 531-32 (describing the
goal of Fordist assembly line as "to embody the skills in the technology itself so that the
workers needed to acquire little human capital to make the system work").
130. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 127, at 1199; Stone, supra note 117, at 531-32.
131. See Stone, supra note 117, at 534 (describing how maintaining key features of
scientific management inured to the benefit of unions and their constituencies).
132. See id.
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employees who never become parents, and accommodating caregiving
needs would appear a logical outgrowth of disability, healthcare, and other
forms of insurance that are a standard feature of employee benefit
packages. 133 Indeed, one could imagine a system of caregiving benefits
developing at the same time that other workplace benefits became
commonplace, had women not been so absent from the workplace. Given
that the demographics of the workplace are changing, an important initial
question in forging a response to the contemporary caregiving crisis is
whether employers can be expected to voluntarily augment their provision
of caregiving-related benefits or make other changes at work in response to
heightened demand for this type of accommodation by a new generation of
workers. 1
34
Unfortunately, there is ample reason to believe that an entirely private
solution to work/family conflict will not be forthcoming. While some
employers have made meaningful changes to their leave and benefits plans
incident to the large-scale entry of women into the paid labor force, they
are a distinct minority.' 35 Moreover, many of these changes are limited and
piecemeal efforts that, like the FMLA, provide modest relief to some
individual employees, but fail to effect wholesale changes in work structure
that would enable long-term integration of professional goals and
133. While the need for caregiving accommodation is associated principally with the
pregnancy and childrearing responsibilities of mothers, it is of equal necessity to employees
of both genders who must deal with illnesses of spouses, partners, and parents. See Case,
supra note 9, at 1766 (drawing parallels between accommodating workers engaged in
childcare and accommodating workers with seriously ill spouses and elderly parents).
Indeed, the majority of FMLA leave taken by employees since the Act's passage has been
for purposes of contending with a serious health condition of the employee or a family
member, rather than for birth or adoption of a child. See Michael Selmi, The Limited Vision
of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 44 VILL. L. REV. 395, 408 (1999) (summarizing 1997
government studies indicating that 59% of employees who took leave under the FMLA in an
eighteen-month period immediately following the Act's passage did so to care for
themselves, not to give birth or care for a newborn).
134. The number of mothers participating in market work, particularly those with young
children, has increased dramatically since the mid-twentieth century. By 1994, 62% of
women with children under age six were members of the labor force, as compared to only
12% of women with children under age six were in the labor force in 1950. FUNDAMENTALS
OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 10 (Employee Benefit Research Institute, 5th ed. 1997).
See also MINDY FRIED, TAKING TIME: PARENTAL LEAVE POLICY AND CORPORATE CULTURE
17-18 (Ronnie J. Steinberg ed., 1998) (noting that as of 1994 women were filling 67% of
new jobs created and that of women in the workforce, 80% would become pregnant during
their working lives).
135. The Bureau of Labor Statistics provides analytical studies of employee benefits
since the mid-1990s. As of 2000, only five percent of employers offered flexible scheduling
for parents, only five percent provided assistance with childcare, and only two percent
provided funds for childcare or on-site childcare. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT.
OF LABOR, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY IN
THE UNITED STATES 2000 at http://bls.gov./ncs/ebs/sp/ebb 10019.pdf (no date available).
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caregiving responsibilities. 36  Instances of employer-initiated structural
changes of this variety remain rare, serving more as anecdotal anomalies
than as models for widespread change. 1
37
This constrained response to caregiving needs in the face of increased
attention to women's disadvantage at work can be attributed to many
causes, including employer ignorance and institutional constraints, 38 as
well as unconscious discrimination against women. 139  The most
compelling influence on the extent of voluntary accommodation, however,
may well be an emerging blueprint for workplace relationships that
challenges the norm of employer responsibility for employee life needs,
which would otherwise support the call for accommodation of caregiving.
The advent of a globalized and decreasingly industrialized economy in the
last several decades has effected a variety of changes in the way employers
and employees view their obligations to one another. The secure and
predictable jobs associated with the 1940s and 1950s have diminished,
giving way to a variety of "precarious employment" relationships in which
workers have significantly diminished expectations of long-term
employment. 140  In response to the pressures of ongoing technological
136. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 5 (describing company-initiated
caregiving policies as a "pyrrhic victory: a set of mommy-track policies that offer flexibility
at the price of work success").
137. See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 36, at 492-99 (describing Deloitte & Touche's firm-
wide implementation of a "Women's Initiative" in response to significant attrition by
women accountants, which included instituting a flexible work time policy that does not
require the employee to exit the partnership track, creating greater transparency in
assignment of work, providing sensitivity training for coworkers, and requiring partners to
meet accountability standards).
138. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that companies often
refrain from implementing policies that would favor working mothers for fear of liability
under federal anti-discrimination laws); Sturm, supra note 36, at 478 (noting that employers
generally take an ad hoc approach to human resource problems and do not necessarily have
the organizational systems in place to recognize the potential connection between fairer
personnel policies and corporate efficiency).
139. See Selmi, supra note 5, at 745-46 (describing how employers may engage in
subtle practices of discrimination such as not mentoring young women or not granting
female employees long-term work assignments based on a general misperception about
women's commitment to work). For in-depth treatment of the notion of "unconscious
discrimination" see Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1161, 1187 (1995) (discussing theory of social cognition that describes how cognitive
structures and processes involved in categorization and information processing often result
in stereotyping); Amy Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1131 (1999)
(characterizing "inadvertent bias" as the result of decision-makers' reliance on "reflexive or
unthinking distortions in the application of neutral and seemingly reasonable criteria to the
assessment of employees from disfavored groups").
140. Katherine Stone uses the term "precarious employment" to refer to any individual
employed with no express or implicit promise of job security. See Stone, supra note 117, at
542 (2001). See also CAPPELLI, supra note 128, at 17 ("The old employment system of
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change, increased international competition, and rapidly fluctuating market
demands, employers have developed a preference for short-term labor that
allows them to fill immediate personnel needs while maintaining future
flexibility.14'
This change accompanies a shift away from the social contract of
employment that predominated in the mid-twentieth century workplace,
and has important implications for voluntary accommodation of
caregiving. 42 The previous social contract, which envisioned an exchange
of long-term security for loyal work, accords with what has been called the
"lifecycle" model of employment. 143  That model contemplates that
employers will make significant investments in employees at the outset of
the employment relationship, usually in the form of employer-funded
training. In economic terms, the employee is overpaid during the period in
which she receives training to the extent her marginal product is less than
the wages she receives. 144  Over time, however, the employee becomes
more skilled and more productive, ultimately creating value in excess of
her wages and thereby permitting the employer to recoup its initial
investment. 145 Structuring the relationship in this way makes sense from
secure, lifetime jobs with predictable advancement and stable pay is dead."); Arnow-
Richman, supra note 127, at 1200 (noting that because employers can no longer offer long-
term employment they frequently hire workers for a discrete purpose and then let them go
when their task or project is completed); Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 1432 (2001) (noting that "any expectation that employment
security for any segment of the workforce could be earned through long and loyal service is
now illusory"); Green, supra note 129, at 100-02 (noting growth in temporary employment
agencies and rise of part-time and independent contractor relationships in response to
corporate demand for institutional flexibility); Schultz, supra note 4, at 1920 (noting how
newer companies are subcontracting out internal services, and relying on contingent and
overtime employment rather than maintaining or adding permanent employees).
141. For a more detailed discussion of the causes of these trends and their effect on the
work relationship see generally CAPPELLI, supra note 128, at 4-5; Arnow-Richman, supra
note 127, at 1198-1202; Green, supra note 129, at 99-104; Stone, supra note 117, at 553-
72.
142. For an explanation of the social contract of employment associated with the post-
War period in the United States as well as a definition of that term, see note 127, supra Part
IV.A and accompanying text.
143. This term comes from Stewart Schwab's concept of "life-cycle" justice, which he
uses to reconcile apparent inconsistencies in courts' treatment of unjust dismissal suits. See
Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will,
92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 10-11 (1993) (suggesting that courts manipulate wrongful discharge
law to protect workers at the beginning and end of their careers when they are most
vulnerable to employer opportunism, while maintaining the presumption of at-will
employment in suits by mid-career employees, who are less at risk).
144. See id. at 14. See generally GARY BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 18-29 (1964) (modeling
employer incentives to invest in firm-specific training for workers); CAPPELLI, supra note
128, at 46-47 (summarizing Becker's analysis).
145. This generally occurs during mid-career when the employee has mastered the
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the perspectives of both the employee and the employer: The parties share
equally in the costs and benefits of training over the course of the
employee's career, provided that the relationship continues.1 46  The
employee gains long-term job security; the employer gains a more valuable
and experienced worker.
Accommodation of caregiving holds comparable potential for
achieving mutual gain over the course of the employment relationship.
While the advantages for the employer are less apparent, accommodations,
like training, can improve worker productivity and future commitment,
particularly in situations involving reductions in work time. The number of
hours an employee works does not necessarily correlate with increased
work product, and reduced-time workers are often more efficient than those
working full-time and overtime schedules. 147 Of course, some work time
and workload reductions can be substantial enough to cause temporary
losses in productivity, such as when an employee requires extended leave.
However, such accommodations can still produce future gains for the
employer inasmuch as they instill loyalty and organizational commitment
in those workers who benefit from them. Evidence suggests that
accommodated individuals are likely to both remain with their employers
and work harder at their jobs, when they are able to do so, out of a desire to
relevant skills and achieved peak productivity. Often compensation will be structured so that
the value recouped by the employer will exceed its initial investment in anticipation of other
losses that may come in late career when the employee's productivity declines. See
Schwab, supra note 143, at 14; Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of
Trade and Technology: Implications for Labor and Employment Law, 76 IND. L.J. 1, 6
(2001).
146. See Schwab, supra note 143, at 15 (describing "self-enforcing" nature of long-term
employment relationships predicated on shared responsibility for training); cf CAPPELLI,
supra note 128, at 21 (noting how under traditional lifetime employment model employees
voluntarily pursued company goals, both out of obligation and the belief that such behavior
was in their long-term interest, while companies reaped the benefit of stability, commitment,
and a well-developed, organizationally specific skill set); supra note 127 and accompanying
text.
147. See Reed Abelson, Part-time Work for Some Adds Up to Full-Time Job, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1998, at Al (noting how some employees are able to reduce hours in the
office without reducing work load simply by "learning how to work smarter"); Robert
Johnson, Employers Now Vie to Hire Moms with Young Children, ENTERPRISE, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 19, 2000 at B2 (noting that some employers find it beneficial to offer flexible or part-
time hours and even seek to target mothers of small children as employees because such
employees often work harder and are more productive than workers with traditional
schedules); Elaine St. James, More Employers Offer Flexible Work Policies, WASH. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 2001, at E2 (noting decision of one company to make flexible scheduling available
to all employees after discovering that managers working flexible schedules generated
millions of dollars more in new business than their full-time counterparts). See generally
WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 84-94 (discussing anecdotal examples of
family friendly work policies that not only proved financially feasible but added to the
company's bottom line).
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"pay back" the company. 48 In this respect, accommodation of caregiving
can be considered an investment much like the provision of training at the
outset of an employment relationship. 149 The employer incurs a possible
loss at the point of accommodation but reaps the benefit in the future.1
5 0
Thus, over the long term, both employers and employees could benefit
from a policy of voluntary employer accommodation.
The problem, however, is that with the demise of the reciprocal social
contract of employment, employers are less inclined to view employment
relationships as permanent and have only limited incentive to invest in the
long-term productivity of individual workers. This is most apparent in the
148. See Johnson, supra note 147, at B2 (reporting that company and staffing agency
presidents believe that providing leave for child-related needs generates employee loyalty
and that employees often perform better and are more productive in appreciation of
company flexibility); Part Timers Have Impact, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1997, at H04
(reporting results of Catalyst employee survey finding that 78% of full-time workers and
98% of part-time workers believed offering employees flexible work programs encourages
employees to stay on). Efforts to improve employee loyalty by providing work/life
accommodations were crucial to employers in the late 1990s when the labor market was
tight and employee attrition high, particularly in high-tech fields. See Tam Pui-Wing Tam,
Silicon Valley Belatedly Boots up Programs to Ease Employees' Lives, WALL ST. J., Aug.
29, 2000, at B I (describing various family friendly and work/life programs instituted by
Silicon Valley companies in order to improve employee job satisfaction and retention).
Such efforts remain critical, however, during economic downturns when companies cannot
afford to offer salary increases or other costly benefits to their workers. See Steve Jones,
When the Perks Fade: In a Sour Economy, Managers Have to Get Creative in their Struggle
to Keep Employees Motivated, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2002, at B12 (describing flexibility and
work leave initiatives designed by employers to counteract negative morale due to
downsizing); Melinda Ligos, Personal Business: Career Arc: How to Scale Back the Hours,
but Not the Career, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2001, at 10 (noting that in a slowing economy
employers are likely to continue offering work flexibility "at the current pace while cutting
back on other perks like bonuses or overtime").
149. While accommodation may not always be supplied at the outset of the relationship
the way training is, the caregiving needs of employees tend to be cyclical. With respect to
accommodations required for pregnancy and childrearing, these are likely to be most needed
early in the employee's career.
150. Loss is possible rather than inevitable because accommodation in some instances
may actually save the employer money, such as when the accommodation requested is
modest and the alternative for the employer is to let the worker go and incur the loss of any
initial investment in that individual plus replacement costs. See ARLIE RUSSELL
HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME AND HOME BECOMES WORK 31
(1997) (finding in a study of the policies and practices of a major company that it cost the
employer $40,000 for each skilled worker it had to replace); WILLIAMS, UNBENDING
GENDER, supra note 3, at 88 (suggesting that the cost of replacing a skilled worker is
typically 0.75 or 1.5 times the worker's annual salary). See generally Steven T. Barnett,
Employee Loyalty Should be Seen as a Valuable Business Asset, SEATTLE POST
INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 4, 2002, at El (enumerating sources of costs attendant to employee
attrition which include "[s]earching for a new candidate, selection and hiring costs, training,
reduced production until the employee becomes proficient, customer service lapses, and
decreased productivity by team members or others who work with the new employee until
he or she gets up to speed").
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trends in employer provision of in-house training. In the current economy,
employers are less willing than in the past to make costly initial
investments in workers, due to the likelihood that their need for the skills in
question will change or that, in better economic times, trained workers will
be inclined to take their careers and skills elsewhere.1 5' Instead, employers
are outsourcing the skills-acquisition process or are looking for employees
who come to the job with the requisite training or experience.152 In the
same way, employers lack the incentive to provide potentially costly
accommodations where they do not anticipate being able to spread the
expense of those accommodations over the course of the employee's
career. The prevailing expectation is that employers will extract as much
work product as possible from the employee at the outset of the
relationship, while her function and skills are relevant, giving only limited
attention to long-term productivity. 153 This makes sense from the
perspective of the employer who may find it difficult to assess its long-term
needs or the transferability of an employee's skill set to the employer's
future undetermined endeavors.154 Even in situations where the requested
151. See CAPPELLI, supra note 128, at 47 (noting that high turnover rates and uncertainty
about companies' future needs in terms of skill sets and human resources create
disincentives to investing in worker training).
152. See id. at 176-77 (describing development of practical training niche among
colleges and proprietary institutions and employers' growing reliance on these part-time and
executive programs).
153. See id at 176 (noting that while it is important for new economy companies to keep
their work teams active and intact during the course of a particular product's development,
employers have only limited concern with the long-term tenure of employees after a
project's completion).
154. Of course, it appears to offer little in the way of reciprocal benefits to employees.
See id at 13 (suggesting that in the reduced supervision management structures of the new
workplace "[o]rganizations are demanding more for employees but offering them less");
Stone, supra note 117, at 568-69 (noting "fundamental paradox" of new workplace wherein
employers seek to "motivate employees to provide commitment to quality, productivity,
efficiency, and firm goals while dismantling the job security and job ladders that
[previously] characterized large organizations"). Arguably there is a degree of mutuality in
short-term employment relationships, despite the loss of job security, insofar as the
employee gains exportable skills and experience that he or she can leverage in the external
labor market, what is sometimes described as the "new" social contract of employment. See
CAPPELLI, supra note 128, at 29 (noting that "[t]he most crucial part of the [new] deal-and
the one apparent element of reciprocity-is the promise on the employer's side to help
support the development of employee skills" that will yield some security in the external
labor market); Arnow-Richman, supra note 127, at 1202 ("[T]he new understanding is that
the employee's lifelong relationship will be with the market rather than the company .... );
Stone, supra note 117, at 525 ("One of the most important terms of the new psychological
contract is the promise of employers to give employees general skills and training. This is
known as the promise of employability security, and it is treated as a substitute for the
former promise of employment security."). Accommodation of caregiving, however, would
hold little place in such an understanding. Rather each employer in the string of employers
over the worker's career would expect full-scale performance for the duration of the
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accommodation is inexpensive or costless, efforts to achieve voluntary
changes at work may be hampered by institutional preferences for the
status quo. Particularly in difficult economic times, where employers can
choose from a steady stream of unencumbered workers, there is little
reason for companies to make significant changes in work structure without
the prospect of immediate gain.
This prediction regarding employers' unwillingness to institute
voluntary plans to meaningfully accommodate caregiving is buttressed by
larger trends in the provision of private benefits. There has been growing
recognition of the desirability of reducing individuals' dependence on
employers for other types of benefits such as health insurance and
retirement funds. Recent increases in the number of Americans without
health insurance has focused renewed national attention on the viability of
universal healthcare and prompted grassroots initiatives for publicly
orchestrated coverage in a number of states.1 55 Employers on the whole are
scaling back insurance programs, eliminating eligibility among lower-level
employees, requiring higher premium payments from covered workers, and
in some cases canceling health plans all together. 56 The role of rising
unemployment in the growing numbers of uninsured individuals, as well as
those with inadequate retirement savings, highlights the challenge of tying
social welfare benefits to a single employer in a fluid labor market. A
system that relies on the employer as the platform for delivering benefits
and services works well for individuals who remain with a single employer
for the life of their career; but it fails those who move in and out of the
workforce or make frequent movements between paying jobs.
Consequently, policymakers on a national level have considered making
significant changes in the structure of the retirement system that would
individual's tenure with that organization.
155. See Council Backs Principles for Universal Health Care, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD,
Mar. 4, 2003, at 2B (noting Portland city council's approval of resolution supporting goal of
universal health care in Maine and offering preliminary principles for developing system);
Liz Kowalczyk, Consultants Urge Universal Health Care in Mass. Plan to be Proposed to
Legislature Would Cost up to $6B Extra, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 20, 2002, at DI (describing
report of Massachusetts state legislature advisory committee identifying means of ensuring
health care coverage for all state residents, including creation of a "public 'single payer
agency'); Bernard Wysocki, Jr., Oregon to Vote on Hot-Button Issue of Universal Health
Care, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2002, at B1 (describing 2002 Oregon ballot initiative that
proposed making the state the sole payer of residents' medical bills using funds collected
through payroll and income taxes).
156. See Kelly K. Spors & Sarah Lueck, More People Lack Health Insurance, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 30, 2002, at A2 (reporting the number of individuals without health insurance
began rising again in 2000 following a short decline between 1998 and 1999); Michael
Waldholz, Perscriptons: Health-Care Cost Explosion Will Trickle Down to Workers, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 12, 2002, D6 (describing how companies are passing increased health insurance
costs onto employees and in some cases eliminating coverage and are likely to continue to
do so as costs increase).
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shift the burden of saving away from employers and onto individual
workers. In early 2003, President Bush proposed the institution of several
new individual retirement vehicles with tax-free payouts designed to
encourage personal long-term investing, and the administration has toyed
with the idea of eliminating tax deductions that companies now enjoy when
contributing to employee retirement plans.'
57
Therefore, by all accounts, the nature of employment is changing from
an institution of long-term interdependence to one in which workers make
"spot" commitments to multiple employers over the life of their career.' 58
Where employers do not anticipate permanent relationships with their
workers, they will necessarily have limited incentive to voluntarily invest
in individual accommodations. Indeed, the trend in the provision of
traditional benefits appears to be chipping away at the historical idea that
the employer should be the party primarily responsible for the life needs of
its workers. Within this emerging understanding of the employer's role in
the social welfare system, it would be unwise to leave the issue of
workplace accommodation of caregiving wholly to market forces.
C. Norms and Culture in the "Me, Inc." Workplace
Since full-scale voluntary accommodation of caregiving is unlikely to
be forthcoming, government mandated accommodation emerges as a
logical alternative. The use of government directives in this context is
consistent with contemporary legislative efforts to achieve equal
opportunity at work through the ADA and the FMLA 159 and does only
limited injustice to the prevailing notion that government intervention in
employer behavior is a mechanism of last resort. 16  Perhaps more
importantly, recent changes in the way people work suggest opportunities
for employers to facilitate integration of their employees' job performance
and caregiving responsibilities. Increased access to technology, combined
with greater job flexibility, makes telecommuting, flex-time, and other
157. See Mary Williams Walsh, Shifting the Burden of Funding Pensions, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 2003, at Cl (describing Bush account proposal as "meant to produce fundamental
changes in the way Americans think about saving for retirement and to shift the primary
responsibility from the business community to the individual").
158. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 145, at 3 (defining a "'spot market' for labor" as one
in which employers purchase only needed hours of labor on a short-term or daily basis and
workers are paid on a monetary basis for the product given without any additional benefits
or in-kind compensation); Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 22, at 2169 (describing
labor "spot market" as a "market in which a quantum of work [is] exchanged for a
corresponding quantum of pay").
159. See supra Part II (describing the accommodation mandates contained in these laws).
160. See supra Part IV.A. and accompanying text (describing "residual" role of
government in issues of employee access to social welfare benefits).
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creative work schedules more viable for employers. 161  The swell of
alternative work arrangements and independent contractor relationships
means at least some individuals have greater ability to set their own terms
and conditions of employment, including the quantity and type of work
they take on and the hours in which they perform it.162 For these reasons, it
would seem that mandated accommodation of caregiving would occasion
only modest intrusions into employer autonomy.
That vision, however, fails to account for corresponding developments
in work culture that foster a sentiment of individualism among workers and
raise the bar on performance standards in ways that are likely to undermine
accommodation efforts. In the new economy, employers have a significant
interest in obtaining the maximum contribution and commitment from their
employees for the length of their tenure. Specifically, employers seek and
reward workers who engage in "extra-role" behavior, defined as
discretionary activity that goes beyond bare work requirements.
63
161. See Green, supra note 129, at 101 (noting that "there is general agreement that the
employment relationship in both white- and blue-collar sectors of the American workplace
is on the whole becoming more contingent, flexible, and individualized than in years past");
Stone, supra note 117, at 523 (noting that employers are offering "flexible forms of work..
• [and] have discovered the value of having workers who possess a variety of skills that can
be deployed on many different job assignments"). Opportunities for work flexibility,
particularly the availability of telecommuting arrangements, are generally assumed to be
favorable for women and caregivers. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note
3, at 85-86; Rhode, supra note 8, at 844. See generally Michelle A. Travis, Telecommuting.
The Escher Stairway of Work/Family Conflict, 55 ME. L. REV. 261 [hereinafter Travis,
Telecommuting] (summarizing arguments of telecommuting proponents who suggest that
flexible work arrangements decrease the gendered division of paid labor by enabling women
to combine wage work and domestic responsibilities and consequently to pursue high level
managerial and executive positions).
162. See, e.g., Travis, Telecommuting, supra note 161, at 271 (noting that for some
workers, primarily male employees with bargaining power, telecommuting offers greater
autonomy, flexibility, and job satisfaction); Schultz, supra note 4, at 1921 (describing an
"ideal" view of the new decentralized employment relationship under which "people would
be free to become nomadic entrepreneurs, who move from firm to firm and even position to
position in order to exploit good opportunities"); cf Green, supra note 129, at 104
(suggesting that contemporary organizational changes may eliminate some sources of race
and gender discrimination by "offer[ing] promise that employers will finally see what
women and minorities can accomplish with a more flexible account of individual strengths
and weaknesses").
163. CAPPELLI, supra note 128, at 46. See also FREDERICK F. REICHHELD, THE LOYALTY
EFFECT: THE HIDDEN FORCE BEHIND GROWTH, PROFITS, AND LASTING VALUE 92 (1996)
(describing desirable employees as those whose self-motivation yields surpluses for the
employer and customers); Amow-Richman, supra note 127, at 1207 (discussing employers'
focus on motivating "above-average performance" that will increase firm productivity and
success); Green, supra note 129, at 144 (describing trend toward "an involvement-centered
workplace that values individual skills and achievement over prescribed hierarchical
status"); Stone, supra note 117, at 557 (describing employers' interest in encouraging
"organizational citizenship behavior" of its workers).
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Companies expect their employees to self-educate, initiate new ideas, and
assist their employers in achieving better products, services, and methods
of production, in much the same way that the companies' executives and
shareholders would. 164  Indeed, many of the hallmarks of modem
management technique, including the decentralization of decision making,
the creation of stock option compensation plans and employee stock
purchasing programs, the professionalization of titles, and the initiation of
internal and peer-based dispute resolution programs represent ways of
incentivizing entrepreneurial behavior and treating workers as owners.1
65
The goal is to empower workers to act as their own profit-maximizing
entities, who will contribute directly to the employer's ultimate success.
This means that while employment relationships are becoming shorter
in duration, they are simultaneously becoming more demanding. In such
an environment, principles of equality and merit-based treatment are likely
to intensify to the detriment of employees balancing caregiving
responsibilities. For instance, contemporary managers and employees have
long believed that degree and intensity of work are indicators of success
and that long work hours, generally expected to be performed at the work
site, are essential to advancement. 166 Indeed, time spent at work has been
steadily increasing since the 1960s, and Americans work significantly more
paid labor hours per year than employees in most Western countries.
67
Although this reliance on quantity as a measure of work quality is
doubtlessly a job practice rooted in ideal worker norms-and may be
164. See Stone, supra note 117, at 556 ("[Managers] want employees to innovate, to
pitch in, to have an entrepreneurial attitude toward their jobs, to behave like owners"); cf
Amow-Richman, supra note 127, at 1209 (noting that "[modem c]ompanies need
employees who will be innovative, hard-working, and loyal to their projects and their co-
workers"); Green, supra note 129, at 107 (noting that "[t]he new workplace ... places
responsibility with the individual employee to define his or her own career path and to seek
out the training, networking, and mentoring needed for achievement").
165. See Stone, supra note 117, at 558-59 (offering examples of these types of
management and compensation initiatives and explaining their role in fostering
organizational citizenship behavior).
166. See FRIED, supra note 134, at 34 (noting that out of a sample of employees
surveyed, all believed they were expected to work over forty hours per week); HOCHSCHILD,
THE TIME BIND, supra note 148, at 19 (quoting personnel handbook given to new employees
at one company which stated, "Time spent on the job is an indication of commitment. Work
more hours."). See generally Belinda M. Smith, supra note 8, at 274-81 (describing how
time norms regarding the number of hours worked, when hours are worked, and the extent
of leave available to employees structure employment and control workers).
167. See FRIED, supra note 134, at 33 (noting that employees are working twenty eight-
hour days, or 163 hours more than they did thirty years ago, almost an entire month);
WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 71 (summarizing 1990s studies finding that
Americans and Canadians work twenty percent longer hours than twenty years ago);
Belinda M. Smith, supra note 8, at 276-77 (summarizing studies comparing hours worked
in the United States with work schedules of employees in European and other industrialized
countries).
Vol. 12:345
Accommodation Subverted
subject to challenge as such-it is likely to be a particularly difficult one to
uproot.168  The problem of "face time" is just one aspect of a larger
signaling problem in an economy significantly comprised of service-and
information-driven businesses. In the era of scientific management, in
which work roles were clearly defined and outputs were in the form of
movable goods, assessments of work performance were objective and
could be obtained with relative ease. 169  In the contemporary economy,
performance is more difficult to monitor due to frequent changes in
standards, fluidity of job assignments, as well as the intangible nature of
the work product.170  Thus, employers encourage "tournament" style
behavior through implicit promises of above-average compensation and
bonuses for those employees who outperform their peers. 17' Even where
employees as a group are invested with significant discretion, they are
likely to be competing with one another and simultaneously resentful of
workers perceived as underperforming to the detriment of the team. 
1 72
This description of the contemporary work environment reflects
additional disincentives to voluntary employer accommodation insofar as
employers believe the intensification of existing performance standards and
the ethic of employee self-reliance are essential to productivity. What is
more problematic, however, is that it also creates heightened expectations
for worker performance, which in turn establish the baseline against which
any mandated accommodation will ultimately be judged. As discussed in
Part Ill, cases arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act frequently
reject accommodations for disabled employees that would require altering
an established work pace or overtime expectation; this experience suggests
that whether a given method of accommodation is deemed reasonable
depends largely on established standards of performance. 73 While such
168. See FRIED, supra note 134, at 136-38 (suggesting that emphasis on hours worked,
although discriminatory toward working mothers, is so ingrained that there appear to be few
ways of overcoming this assumption). For a discussion of how the expectation of long
hours might be legally challenged as a discriminatory job practice, see WILLIAMS,
UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 101-13 (proposing use of disparate impact analysis to
oppose job practices based on a "male worker norm").
169. See Stone, supra note 117, at 530 (describing scientific management's reliance on
time and motion studies to identify scientifically accurate "piece rate" for each task and
enable foremen to ensure that each specific job task was precisely performed).
170. See Green, supra note 129, at 103 (noting that in a decentralized workplace with
blurry job boundaries, performance evaluations tend to be amorphous, subjective, and
highly dependent on firsthand observation and interaction).
171. See Schwab, supra note 143, at 17 (discussing how employers may promise large
payouts for hard-working employees as a means of weeding out shirkers where day-to-day
monitoring of workers' efforts is difficult).
172. See Schultz, supra note 4, at 1923 (describing how teamwork fosters negative
competition and creates peer pressure as effective, if not more effective, than traditional top-
down supervision in stimulating worker productivity).
173. See, e.g., Davis v. Microsoft Corp., 37 P.3d 333, 335-36 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)
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results are contrary to the goals of accommodation, there is little reason to
hope that the direction of the law will change soon. The United States
Supreme Court recently addressed the relationship between disability
accommodation and employer seniority policies in U.S. Airways v. Barnett,
holding in favor of the employer and against accommodation. 74 The Court
concluded that the employer was not obligated to retain a disabled worker
in an open position to which he had been temporarily reassigned where the
position would otherwise be subject to seniority-based "bidding" under the
employer's personnel policies.1 75  While the employer's rationale for
denying the accommodation differs factually from the precise objections
that might be asserted in a caregiving context, the opinion is telling in its
respect for the employer's asserted need to administer its policies and
standards fairly and equally among all employees. The import of the
holding for caregiving is clear: According to the Court, the legal right to
accommodation ends where the rights of another worker are impacted.
Thus to the extent non-caregivers are working harder, it is all the more
unlikely that courts will insist on accommodations that involve reductions
in work quantity or pace or deviations from existing standards.
In fact, the culture of the "Me, Inc." workplace and the changes in
employer expectations described here offer a context for understanding the
courts' reluctance to broadly construe accommodation laws consistent with
their aspirational mission. A developing body of law and sociology
scholarship has explained this disconnect in the jurisprudence of disability
accommodation through the heuristics of capture and retrenchment. 76 In
her insightful work on this subject, Linda Hamilton Krieger distinguishes
between formal laws that reinforce existing social norms (such as most
criminal laws) and those laws designed to transform existing practices and
institutions (such as non-discrimination and accommodation mandates). 77
Professor Krieger suggests that where transformative laws seek changes
(upholding employer's decision not to accommodate a Hepatitis C-infected employee who
requested to work 40 hours a week with no overtime where all other employees were
expected to work overtime); Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1121 (10th Cir. 1995)
(ruling in favor of employer who had adopted a new production standard where two
employees could not keep pace and were subsequently fired); Davis v. Florida Power &
Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1305-06 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (finding mandatory overtime work to
be an essential function of the job in denying employee's ADA claim where employer had a
policy of processing all customer orders within 24 hours and employee's coworkers worked
an average of 216 overtime hours each in the year preceding employee's termination); supra
Part III.A.
174. U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1517-18 (2002).
175. See id. at 1517.
176. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 58, at 486-88 (describing problem of "socio-legal
retrenchment," which occurs when pre-existing norms "capture," or subtly assert themselves
within, new laws designed to stimulate social change).
177. See id. at 478-79 (defining "normal law" and "transformative law").
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that sharply conflict with normative systems that continue to enjoy
significant popular support, the dominant norms may subtly reassert
themselves within the legal regime designed to replace them. 78  This
"capture" effect not only constrains implementation of the transformative
law, but also risks legitimating and reifying the very norms it aims to
undermine. 1
79
This explanation of the inter-relationship between law and human
forces is important not only for what it predicts in terms of judicial
interpretation of legally mandated accommodation, but also because it
suggests the potential for counter-productive societal responses from within
institutions targeted by transformative law. This response can take the
form of "backlash" against those who stand to benefit from new legal
requirements, resulting in marginalization or, worse, segregation, which
subverts efforts to achieve substantive equality. 80  Emerging research on
contemporary employers' voluntary use of telecommuting workers
provides an alarming illustration. While telecommuting was once heralded
as an ideal solution for integrating work and family, studies suggest that
employers have implemented the practice in two different ways with
disparate effects on male and female employees.' 81 In one form, employers
offer telecommuting as an option for high-level autonomous professionals
(a class dominated by men), while in another form, employers impose
telecommuting on lower-wage clerical workers (a class dominated by
women), who are often independent contractors unentitled to other
employment benefits.' 82  In this way, employers have co-opted the
transformative potential of the virtual workplace, rewarding entrepreneurial
employees who conform to ideal worker standards, while marginalizing
caregivers who are compelled to accept employment casualization in order
to accommodate family obligations.
The intransigence of the existing normative structure is apparent not
178. See id. at 485-92.
179. See id. at 486 (suggesting that judges are influenced by "taken-for-granted
background rules" that "systematically skew the interpretations of transformative legal rules
so that those rules . . . provide a vehicle for the reassertion and relegitimation of the very
norms and institutions [they] were designed to undermine").
180. See id. at 497 (defining "backlash" as overt and confrontational manifestations of
socio-legal capture that occur when "the application of a transformative legal regime
generates outcomes that conflict with norms and institutions to which influential segments
of the relevant populace retain strong conscious allegiance").
181. See Travis, Telecommuting, supra note 161, at 265 (asserting that "[c]ontrary to
predictions, research on the performance of paid work at home indicates that, for many
women, telecommuting is actually increasing gender inequalities both in the workplace and
at home").
182. Travis, Telecommuting, supra note 161, at 271-75 (reviewing empirical research
documenting different uses of telecommuting by employers and their disparate effect on
women workers).
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only in the behavior of employers, but also in the reactions and sentiments
of employees. Popular constituencies, as much as institutional forces, may
undermine the equalizing effect of accommodation because employer-
supported accommodation is perceived by non-accommodated workers as
preferential treatment in tension with merit-based decision making. The
palpable backlash against race-based affirmative action policies is a prime
example. While the non-discrimination principle of Title VII, once
perceived as groundbreaking, has largely been mainstreamed, there is
continued resistance to reliance on the same principles of inclusion to
support affirmative behavior toward historically mistreated groups. 183 A
common perception is that affirmative action imposes a system of
preferences that advantages some (assumed to be unworthy) over others
(assumed to be worthy), resulting in unfair outcomes under dominant
formal equality norms. 184  Accommodation of caregiving invites similar
backlash. While mandated accommodation beyond the unpaid leave
currently required by federal law is more hypothetical than real, objections
are already being levied against it. Commentators have suggested that
accommodating caregivers unduly privileges those who choose to become
parents, while impliedly holding non-parents (in particular unmarried and
homosexual individuals) to higher performance standards, in effect
requiring them to pick up the slack for their accommodated co-workers.
85
Such rhetoric presages a work environment in which caregivers as a group
(and conceivably women by extension) are essentialized and penalized, in
183. A prime example of this was California voters' passage of "Proposition 209," a
ballot initiative amending the state constitution to prohibit race-conscious admissions
policies in California state schools, employment, or contracting. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, §
31 (2003) "The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any
individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the
operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting."). See generally
Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1335, 1336-39 (1997) (describing the scope of the proposition); Community News File:
South-Central Los Angeles; Jackson Leads Bus Tour to Fuel Opposition to Proposition 209,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1997, at B4 [hereinafter Community News File] (describing extensive
popular controversy over the proposition). More recently, the University of Michigan,
supported by numerous amici curiae, won limited approval from the Unites States Supreme
Court for their race-conscious admission policies. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 Sup. Ct.
2325, 2342-47 (2003). It remains to be seen what, if any, effect this decision will have in
the employment context.
184. See generally Krieger, supra note 58, at 495-96 (describing socio-legal backlash
against affirmative action based on perception that such practices disdain merit-based
assessment and result in unfair outcomes).
185. See, e.g., ELINOR BURKETT, THE BABY BOON: How FAMILY FRIENDLY AMERICA
CHEATS THE CHILDLESS 25-61 (2000); Case, supra note 9, at 1758 (expressing fear that
requiring employer responsibility for caregiving benefits will result in "a taking ... from
one group of female employees (childless women who will remain childless), for the benefit
predominantly of another group of male employees (those with wives and children)").
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much the same way minority group members frequently suffer stigma in
the wake of contemporary criticisms of affirmative action.
In sum, contemporary changes in the work environment, while
offering the promise of more flexible work practices, may create more
roadblocks than pathways to successful accommodation of caregiving.
Even if the dangers of judicial interpretation can be circumvented to some
extent-such as through the adoption of fixed rather than flexible
accommodation mandates-there remains the significant problem of
ground-level repercussions against novel legislative efforts to assist
caregivers. Where work culture is moving swiftly toward a model of
increased worker independence and ingenuity, legally-mandated
accommodation may exacerbate distinctions between those employees who
demonstrate extraordinary commitment (as conventionally understood) and
those perceived as needing special leeway.
V. The Future of Accommodation and Other Work/Family Initiatives
The preceding part provided both an explanation and a prediction
regarding the efficacy of accommodation initiatives. Given the changing
nature of the employment relationship, it is unlikely that employers will
adequately accommodate caregivers of their own accord and equally
unlikely that government-mandated accommodation will meaningfully
integrate caregivers into the existing work regime. This part returns to the
initial question of how accommodation of caregiving can exist successfully
in a social environment dominated by equality norms. In light of the
intransigent nature of work/family conflict, it is unrealistic to expect any
initiative to fully eliminate caregivers' disadvantage, and it may be that
feminists must ultimately be satisfied with something less than complete
results-based equality. Acknowledging this difficulty, the next section
offers a modest critique and proposal: The project of removing women's
disadvantage due to caregiving may best be served by working within the
private model of employment, using government action merely to
incentivize employer initiatives and supply residual benefits, rather than by
fashioning an altogether new regime that might well prove to be
unattainable.
A. The Continuum of Responses: Change Work or Change Caregiving?
The social developments traced in Part IV suggest that work/family
initiatives must account more fully for the environment in which caregiver
exclusion occurs and, in particular, the dynamics that magnify existing
inequality. Feminist legal scholars have already done much to envision a
new intersection between government, work, and caregiving in response to
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the changing nature of market employment as well as changes in
contemporary family composition. 8 6 These contributions can loosely be
characterized along a continuum of efforts that aim on one end to
drastically alter the structure of work and on the other end to forge a new
understanding of family caregiving and dependency.
Martha Fineman, for instance, in her most recent contribution to the
work/family dialogue, emphasizes how vast changes in the composition of
the family and the nature of work highlight the need for direct government
support for caregiving. Drawing on her extensive writings on the legal
regulation of intimate relationships, 87 Professor Fineman argues that
background social structures, such as the dominance of a nuclear family,
are eroding, exposing the universal nature of dependency and requiring a
reallocation of responsibility between public and private resources.,
88
Historically, wives provided "voluntary" full-time family care and
employers provided a family wage and social insurance to husbands,
leaving the state merely to facilitate services or intervene at the point of
breakdown.' 89 Professor Fineman suggests that developments such as the
entry of women into the workplace, the rise of no-fault divorce, and the
decline in long-term employment with adequate benefits call for significant
state involvement in the social welfare of its citizens. 90 If families and
employers are not providing adequately or fairly for the needs of all people,
the government should do so through direct subsidies to caregivers as well
as by securing necessary social goods for each citizen regardless of the
market value of his or her labor.
19
186. Indeed, the extant legal literature on work/family conflict is far too rich to
comprehensively consider here. In light of my focus on the influence of changing work
dynamics on the viability of accommodating caregiving, I will concentrate in this Section on
two scholars who directly tackle these workplace changes in formulating their proposals.
See, e.g., Fineman, Contract and Care, supra note 6, at 1432-34; Schultz, supra note 4, at
1920-27.
187. See, e.g., FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 6; Martha Albertson
Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in American Law and Society,
1993 UTAH L. REV. 387 (1993); Martha Albertson Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural
Family: The Limits on Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 955 (1991).
188. See Fineman, Contract and Care, supra note 6, at 1428 ("[B]oth family and
workplace have changed so fundamentally over the past several decades that it is impossible
to continue to view them as background to a privatized and individualized society... [and]
it would be unjust to consider these institutions, as they now exist, as adequate to their
historic assigned tasks.").
189. See id. at 1423 (describing "traditional social policy thinking" under which "the
private family is responsible for dependency; the market for distribution of social goods;
and the government for ... supervising it all .... ).
190. See id. at 1428-34 (describing significant changes in the contemporary family and
workplace that affect the balance of home, market, and state responsibilities).
191. See id at 1436-39 (proposing a restructured society in which the state facilitates
distribution of income and benefits to all citizens).
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In contrast, Vicki Schultz responds to these social changes by
demanding greater government intervention in the allocation and
compensation of market work. Recognizing the profoundly important role
that work plays in shaping personal identity and citizenship, Professor
Schultz proposes market work as the primary foundation for a stable
democratic order and the appropriate site for redistributive regulatory
efforts. 192 While discrimination laws have enabled certain groups to obtain
access to work, they are not capable of generating the structural
transformations needed to create viable and sustainable working conditions
under which all citizens can work and support themselves.' 93 That goal has
been further undermined by the increasingly tenuous nature of employment
and other workplace trends that threaten to devalue not only women and
minorities, but all workers, apart from a privileged few.' 94 To combat this
problem, Professor Schultz urges a state-orchestrated overhaul of market
work, including job creation and training opportunities to enable full
employment, the enactment of living wage legislation (coupled with wage
subsidies if needed), and the reduction of the full-time work-week for all
employees. 95 Only by fully re-imagining work in this way, can paid work
as an institution realize its potential as a platform for equal citizenship.
These competing frameworks for responding to social fluctuations
grow out of a broader debate within work/family scholarship. While the
historical distinction between equality and difference feminism has
diminished, 196 a comparable division has emerged between scholars
emphasizing the need for gender equality in attachment to paid work and
scholars focusing on the need to demarginalize caregiving practices
traditionally performed by women.' 97 Under what has been called the
192. See Schultz, supra note 4, at 1928 (noting that "paid work is the only institution that
can be sufficiently widely distributed to provide a stable foundation for a democratic order"
and that because of this, society chooses to organize itself around employment).
193. Id. at 1938.
194. See id. at 1919-27 (noting that in the new economic order marked by flexible
capitalism and global competition "almost all workers are in danger of becoming 'women,'
in the sense that they are experiencing the problems and dilemmas that women have
traditionally faced with respect to paid work," such as lack of job security and wage
inequality).
195. See id. at 1942-60.
196. See supra Part II.A.
197. See generally WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 226-31
(summarizing viewpoints of several scholars and drawing comparisons to the special
treatment/equal treatment debate); Joan Williams, "It's Snowing Down South ": How to
Help Mothers and Avoid Recycling the Sameness/Difference Debate, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
812, 815 (2002) [hereinafter Williams, Snowing Down South] (describing recent dialogue
between feminists scholars as a "new round ... [that] follows a familiar pattern. Feminists
committed to making traditionally masculine gender performances available to women are
pitted against feminists committed to decreasing the costs of conventionally feminine
gender performances.").
2003
Texas Journal of Women and the Law
"universal breadwinner" model of equality, reforms target the workplace
and aim to establish appropriate benefits and services to enable women to
participate meaningfully in the paid labor market; while under the so-called
"caregiver parity" model of equality, reforms target caregiving itself,
seeking to revalue women's traditional role (largely through public
subsidies) so that caregivers can support themselves and enter and exit
employment costlessly.198  The difference is substantial on a theoretical
level. From the caregiver parity perspective, a universal breadwinner model
over-emphasizes the value of market work and entrenches, or at best
ignores, the social structures that devalue caregiving; 199 from the universal
breadwinner perspective, a caregiver parity model segregates caregivers in
a way that is antithetical to true equality.200
While the tension between these choices is intellectually compelling,
its resolution is far less relevant to the core task of eliminating women's
marginalization and workplace disadvantage than extant work/family
scholarship would suggest. The growing emphasis on equal
198. 1 borrow the terms "universal breadwinner" and "caregiver parity" from Nancy
Fraser's important discussion of the inapplicability of family wage ideology to a post-
industrial society. NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE
"POSTSOCIALIST" CONDITION 51-59 (1997). See also Marion Crain, "Where Have All the
Cowboys Gone?" Marriage and Breadwinning in Postindustrial Society, 60 OHIO ST. L.
REV. 1877, 1929-31 (1999) [hereinafter Crain, "Where Have All the Cowboys Gone?"]
(adopting this terminology). In so doing, I do not suggest that all work/family proposals can
be placed beneath one of these two umbrellas; certainly many work/family scholars have
characterized the strains of this discussion somewhat differently. See, e.g., WILLIAMS,
UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 226-31 (distinguishing between "maternalists" and
"equal parenting" advocates); Laura Kessler, Women's Family Caregiving as a Cultural and
Political Practice: Bridging the Maternalist/Nonmaternalist Divide in the Discourse Over
Care Work 6-8 (working draft on file with author) (characterizing the sides of the debate as
"maternalist" and "nonmaternalist"). Neither do I suggest that Professor Schultz's or
Professor Fineman's ideas may be labeled in this manner, for their nuanced approaches do
more to bridge the debate in my view than to advance either side. However, I avail myself
of Fraser's terminology at this point in order to capture the distinction between identifying
the inaccessibility of paid work as the primary source of caregiver inequality verses
targeting the historical undervaluation of caregiving as the core concern, conscious of the
fact that I oversimplify somewhat in the process.
199. See FRASER, supra note 198, at 54 (arguing that under the universal breadwinner
model, the "ideal-typical citizen" is "nominally gender-neutral" but still "implicitly
masculine"); Crain, "Where Have All the Cowboys Gone?," supra note 198, at 1930 (noting
that the universal breadwinner model "privileges men's traditional sphere, paid
employment, and does nothing to accord social value to women's traditional work,
carework").
200. See FRASER, supra note 198, at 58 ("[l]t is hard to imagine how 'separate but equal'
gender roles could provide genuine equality of respect today."); Crain, "Where Have All the
Cowboys Gone?," supra note 198, at 1931 (noting that the caregiver parity model
"encourages couples to keep one partner on the breadwinner track and to relegate the other
to the caregiver track, rather than to alternate or share carework ... institutionaliz[ing] the
gendered division of labor").
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accommodation, and by consequence equal parenting, removes in large
degree the danger of reinforcing the gendered nature of market and family
work, which animates the debate between the universal breadwinner and
caregiver parity models of reform. If the universal breadwinner approach
aims to empower women to act as ideal workers, defined by current
standards of work performance premised on male norms, then certainly it
risks diminishing the cultural and social value of women's historical role as
caregivers. On the other hand, if efforts at reforming market work aim to
enable all people to participate equally in paid work, as Vicki Schultz
urges, then the model implicitly acknowledges the value of caregiving-
both men's and women's caregiving-as well as the personal leisure and
civic activities of all individuals which justify time away from
employment. 20 1  Similarly, while a caregiver parity approach that
subsidized only women's caregiving might reify notions of women's
appropriate domestic role, a model that adequately rewarded all forms of
care, as Martha Fineman advocates, can encourage universal acceptance of
dependency and care and enable autonomous choices by both men and
women about how to spend their time.
202
If that is the case, the residual question posed by the
breadwinner/caregiver debate is simply whether work or family is
ultimately a better platform for significant social reform. Professors
Schultz and Fineman, for instance, provide alternative accounts of the
appropriate structure for a re-imagined welfare state, the former
maintaining work as the primary site of government intervention and the
latter embracing a novel form of direct regulation of family care. Yet both
are self-described utopian visions that are extraordinarily unlikely to be
realized in the immediate future. 20 3 The established value of family privacy
and the absence of precedent for placing care within the public realm pose
significant obstacles to Fineman's model, as does the questionable ability
of the government to fund and supervise such extensive and novel social
201. See Schultz, supra note 4, at 1955 (arguing that men as well as women desire and
can benefit from reductions in work hours and greater participation in family and civic life).
202. See FIRNEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 6, at 234-35 (using the concept
of the "mother/child" dyad as a metaphor for the interrelationship between "caretaker" and
"dependent" and asserting that "men can and should be Mothers . . . in the stereotypical
nurturing sense of that term").
203. See FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 6, at 232 (recognizing that
"rethinking on this scale is a quite grandiose objective, requiring massive reconsideration of
many assumed roles and institutions . . . It is certainly utopian to assume that such an
endeavor would be undertaken, or . . . that it would result in a significant shift in the way
we ... order intimacy."); Schultz, supra note 4, at 1883 (proposing "to describe some of the
central elements of a utopian vision in which women and men from all walks of life can
stand alongside each other as equals, pursuing our chosen projects and forging connected
lives").
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204programming. Similarly, Schultz's model, though more in keeping with
the existing social welfare model, would require a degree of governmental
control over private employment that would hardly be tolerated and which
may well be economically infeasible. Indeed it is the norms underlying our
existing socio-political system-norms that are intensifying in the
emerging economy-that form both the inspiration for proposing these
revolutionary initiatives as well as the chief obstacles to their successful
implementation.
The point here, however, is not to critique either approach, but rather
to harmonize underlying theoretical goals or at least obviate the need to
resolve them. The project of theorizing a restructured workplace and more
equitable distribution of family work has caused conflict among feminists,
which is, at best, antithetical to the realization of long-term goals and, at
worst, holds up the process of implementing interim reform measures. °5
What is needed at the moment is not a universal framework for a
reconfigured social order so much as workable measures to provide
immediate assistance to caregivers, both those who work and those who do
not. What is most important is that such measures be financially and
politically viable, that they provide real rather than symbolic relief, and that
they reduce the risk of popular and judicial backlash. The next section of
this paper turns to the task of delineating examples of this type of relief.
B. Change Within Constraints
I begin by acknowledging my own bias in favor of reforms targeting
workers and the terms and conditions of employment, which strike me as
more politically viable and less socially divisive than direct regulation of
caregiving. Government intervention in employment relationships
currently exists in at least three forms: substantive laws establishing
minimum labor standards and anti-discrimination principles; enabling laws
establishing systems of social insurance premised on workforce
participation; and collective bargaining laws facilitating employee
representation and negotiation of employment terms. Efforts to eliminate
caregiver disadvantage logically should begin by building on this
established infrastructure. In terms of substantive law, activists must
continue the project of using existing discrimination laws and the Family
204. See Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 22, at 2215 (noting that while "[t]he
simplest model to provide for maternity benefits is a governmental program funded through
general revenues," the history of social benefits legislation in the United States suggests that
the political viability of such a program "approaches absolute zero").
205. See Williams, Snowing Down South, supra note 197, at 817 (cautioning that "[i]f
[feminists] insist on sanctifying the 'One True Way,' we will only deflect our energy away
from achieving gender change into the sameness/difference debate and other fights among
feminists").
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Medical Leave Act expansively to provide the broadest possible relief to
caregivers. To move beyond that level, efforts should be directed toward
establishing a publicly administered system of caregiver wage replacement
and revitalizing worker organization.
Before pursuing these ideas further, some preliminary points must be
made. Each of the suggestions enumerated above is a vast subject in itself
that both deserves and has received attention beyond what can be addressed
here. Drawing from a variety of proposals, I aim to delineate a multi-
faceted agenda for reform that maximizes existing legal protections and
begins the process of creating additional sources of benefits and
opportunities for accommodation in a manner as consistent as possible with
established channels of government intervention. Undoubtedly, some will
find my agenda too limited and argue that even if such proposals were fully
embraced, caregivers would continue to suffer systemic disadvantage in the
labor market. Even so, if modest measures of the type urged here are
implemented in their entirety and ultimately prove inadequate, then the
groundwork has been laid to support more aggressive reform. Until such
aggressive reform becomes possible, the following section provides a
framework for taking the first steps.
1. Enforcing Anti-Discrimination Principles and Minimum Labor
Standards
While it is certain that existing federal law regulating the workplace
does not adequately address the range of obstacles to advancement
encountered by working caregivers, it is also certain that these laws could
be used more aggressively. An agenda aimed at assisting caregivers should
begin by supporting efforts to bolster and expand the limited rights
provided under conventional discrimination law and the Family Medical
Leave Act (FMLA). The success of such efforts will depend on-and
doubtlessly be constrained by-the interpretations and opinions of
individual judges whose views may be colored by established gender and
workplace norms. 206  However, there are at least some viable legal
strategies that could make existing benefits and protections more
meaningful to a subset of caregivers, and these strategies should be
zealously pursued.
With respect to Title VII, Joan Williams's scholarship has
demonstrated how theories of liability, such as "sex plus" disparate
treatment, may be used to redress discrimination against mothers (and in
some cases, fathers) where such parents experience differential treatment or
206. Cf supra Part IV.C. (discussing how mainstream normative views assert
themselves within judicial interpretations of novel laws).
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are criticized for failure to conform to traditional gender roles. 207 Such
strategies are particularly effective in cases where the employer makes
openly stereotypical statements about working mothers or caregiving
fathers or renders decisions based on unfounded assumptions about a
mother's dedication to her job or ability to perform competently.0 8
Emerging research on the nature of cognitive bias is likely to make such
strategies viable in more subtle cases as well. Social cognition theory
suggests that group-specific stereotypes result from normal cognitive
processing, in which individuals rely on seemingly benign categorizations
and generalities to assist in selecting and storing information. 209  Once
formed, those stereotypes function as schemes for evaluating group
members and may unconsciously influence employers' decision, as well as
the process by which they obtain and interpret information on which their
decisions are based.21 ° If that is the case, disparate treatment analysis may
be useful for cases of differential treatment in which there is no direct
evidence of discriminatory animus, at least in situations where the
caregiver's performance does not provide a separate justification for the
employer's adverse decision.l 1
207. See, e.g.,WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 101-02; Joan Williams &
Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are
Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 124-33 (2003).
208. See, e.g., Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 55 (1st
Cir. 2000) (finding that plaintiff had sufficient proof to defeat summary judgment where she
was asked by managers about her ability to balance her caregiving with work and where
they expressed concern over her desire to have another child); Trezza v. The Hartford, Inc.,
No. 98 Civ. 2205, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, at *3-6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1998) (finding
in favor of plaintiff where employer made statements about the laziness of working mothers
and failed to consider plaintiff for a promotion, assuming without asking that she would not
want the job because of her family). See generally Williams & Segal, supra note 207, at
123-30 (summarizing other Title VII cases holding in favor of employees where facts
involved explicit stereotypical comments or demeaning behavior targeting mothers).
209. Linda Hamilton Krieger, supra note 139, at 1188 (noting that "stereotypes ... are
cognitive mechanisms that all people, not just prejudiced ones, use to simplify the task of
perceiving, processing, and retaining information about people in memory").
210. The implication is that stereotypes do not assert themselves solely at the point at
which an adverse employment decision is rendered, but rather influence the employer's
perception of an employee long before any action is taken; this means that employer
reliance on pernicious stereotypes is frequently unintentional and unconscious. See id.
211. See Williams & Segal, supra note 207 at 94-101 (describing how cognitive bias
leads to discrimination against women and mothers). A legitimate concern has been voiced
by Laura Kessler that social cognition theory helps only those caregivers who are able to
perform as ideal workers, but are denied opportunities based on unfounded assumptions
about their abilities, while forsaking less privileged women caregivers who are unable to
meet male work standards. Telephone interview with Laura T. Kessler, Associate Professor,
University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law (Feb. 2003) (describing the strategy of
pursuing workplace equality through aggressive use of discrimination laws bolstered by
social cognition theory as "trickle-down feminism"). Cf Kessler, supra note 2, at 402
(noting that the small percentage of successful plaintiffs under discrimination law are the
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Similarly, more can be done to achieve employee-friendly
interpretations of the FMLA. As discussed in Part 1II, several courts have
misapplied the burden of proof associated with FMLA failure-to-reinstate
claims by requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that their employer's behavior
was discriminatorily motivated.212 Such an interpretation undermines both
the key benefit provided by the statute and its purpose in enabling
employees to take leave without loss of job security. In his work on family
leave and fathers, Martin Malin has suggested that failure-to-reinstate
claims should be analyzed as violations of FMLA section (a)(l)'s
prohibition against interference, restraint, or denial of employee rights, not
as discrimination or retaliation claims.213 Section (a)(1), Professor Malin
asserts, is modeled on section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act,
which prohibits interference with employee rights to engage in concerted
behavior.214 That section has never been interpreted to require a showing
exceptional women who do not require any type of accommodation while, unsurprisingly,
many women need accommodations to meet the demands of a full-time job and their duties
as caregiver). To be sure, Professor Williams advocates, in addition to her disparate
treatment strategy, the use of disparate impact litigation targeting systemic obstacles to
women's advancement such as physical requirements, mandatory overtime, and the
unavailability of leave or part-time work, all of which are based on the expectation of a male
worker. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 104-10 (proposing the use of
disparate impact litigation to challenge the structure of promotion tracks, physical build, and
lifting requirements that are designed around male bodies and male work schedules).
However, the likelihood of succeeding with such claims before the federal bench is minimal
at best. See Kathryn Abrams, Book Review, Cross-Dressing in the Master's Clothes, 109
YALE L.J. 745, 755 (2000) (noting that "[w]here feminists see gendered work requirements,
many employers see the job as it has always been done ... [and] courts may share this more
prevalent view"); cf supra Part IV.C (noting the likelihood of judicial backlash in
interpreting transformative work/family accommodation laws). Although the expansive use
of Title VII helps only a minority of women caregivers, pursuing these claims does not
inevitably jeopardize simultaneous efforts to achieve accommodation of non-ideal
caregivers by other means. For instance, the success of comparable disparate treatment
claims in the context of race discrimination-as where qualified African-American
candidates are excluded based on unfounded stereotypes about their ability to perform-
would not be said to diminish the theoretical basis for eradicating systemic obstacles to
minority advancement, such as culturally-biased entry exams, where either the business
rationale for the practice in question is insufficiently persuasive when scrutinized or the
practice in question could be reconfigured or replaced by a less biased measure.
212. See, e.g., Rice, 209 F.3d at 1018. See generally, supra Part III.B.
213. See Malin, supra note 5, at 52 ("The issue under the FMLA is not whether an
employee returning from leave was the victim of discrimination .... Rather the issue [is]
whether the plaintiff [has] been restored to her former job or an equivalent position."). Id. at
51.
214. Id. at 52. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1998) ("It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 7."), with 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (1998) ("It shall be
unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt
to exercise, any right provided under this title[.]") See generally, supra Part III.B. note 107
and accompanying text.
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of employer discrimination, but rather looks at the objective justifications
for the employer's behavior and balances those interests against their
negative effects on employee rights. 21 5 Applying a comparable approach in
the FMLA context would not only remove the difficulties inherent in
proving animus, it would open the door to broader applicability of the
statute in general. Like section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, the FMLA
prohibition against interference could be construed as reaching a range of
employer practices, including the promulgation of facially neutral policies
and rules that discourage use of leave, or expressions of hostility or
harassment against FMLA eligible employees that do not necessarily result
in a tangible employment action.
216
2. Of Incentives and Insurance: Beyond "Baby UI"
Assuming legal strategists can squeeze the maximum amount of
215. Most of the decisive cases arise in the context of employer rules that interfere with
the dissemination of union campaign materials. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S.
556, 572-73 (1978) (finding that employees' off-work distribution of pamphlets containing
both organizational and political messages could not be precluded by employer who "made
no attempt to show that its management interests would be prejudiced in any [manner]" by
distribution); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522 (1976) (remanding with directions to
weigh competing interest of the employer in keeping picketers away from its private
property against the employees' interest in exercising their right to engage in concerted
activity to determine whether violation of section 8(a)(1) had occurred); NLRB v. Babcock
& Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (noting that "when the inaccessibility of
employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by non-employees to communicate
with them through the usual channels, the right to exclude from property has been required
to yield to the extent needed to permit communication of information on the right to
organize"); Republic Aviation v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 802 n.8 (1945) (affirming NLRB
decision asserting that some dislocation of employer property rights may be necessary to
safeguard worker collective bargaining rights and that an employer violates section 8(a)(1)
by prohibiting employee solicitation during work time if the restriction is an unreasonable
impediment to the exercise of those rights); cf Eastern Omni Constructors, Inc. v. NLRB,
170 F.3d 418, 423-24 (1999) (balancing the interests of the employees in handing out and
receiving union literature with the employer's right to express its opinion in finding no
section 8(a)(1) violation).
216. See Malin, supra note 5, at 1091-93 (drawing on law of sexual harassment under
Title VII and asserting that because the FMLA does not require a showing of discrimination,
even less pervasive employer behavior should be actionable if it deters employees from
taking leave). Such an interpretation would be particularly helpful to male caregivers who
suffer harassment for failure to conform to the stereotype of a full-time breadwinner, which
in turn helps women workers by enabling a better division of caregiving responsibilities
within traditional families. See id at 1089 (describing how a hostile work environment
deters fathers from taking leave because, as primary income providers, fathers will be
reluctant to jeopardize their jobs by taking a leave that their employers disapprove of);
Selmi, supra note 5, at 711-12, 773-75 (noting that because men do not take parental leave,
women are forced to take more days off, work fewer hours, and suffer from a weaker
workforce attachment and arguing that men should be compelled to take parental leave upon
birth or adoption of a child to correct this problem and change prevailing gender norms).
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protection out of existing legislation, there remains the significant problem
of the absence of any form of wage replacement for working caregivers.
The issue of wage replacement is critical in making any system of leave or
work reduction viable for employees at all economic levels. It is also
crucial to the goal of equalizing responsibility for caregiving between men
and women in traditional families, where the income of the male head of
household is considered indispensable and the woman's expendable.
217
Some legal scholars advocating paid caregiving leave have focused on the
dichotomous options of requiring employers to provide it or directing
government subsidies to those who perform unpaid care work.218 Another
option, somewhat less explored in the current literature, is the
implementation of a government facilitated compensation system for
caregiving leave that could be jointly-funded by employer and employee
dollars.219
It may seem odd in a paper purporting to offer a pragmatic analysis of
caregiving initiatives to argue for something akin to social welfare
insurance in light of recent efforts to eliminate unemployment
compensation for parents with new children. In June 2000, in response to
an executive order of former President Bill Clinton, the Department of
Labor (DOL) issued the Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation
(BAA-UC) regulations, initiating the first federally subsidized program of
wage replacement for parents in the United States.22°  Under this
217. See Malin, supra note 5, at 1073-74 (noting that where the only available parenting
leave is unpaid, "[t]raditional sex roles that assign primary caregiving responsibilities to the
mother and primary breadwinning responsibilities to fathers ensure that ... the mother will
tend to monopolize the leave. [This is] ... economically rational for many couples in which
the father earns the higher income .... "); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1181, 1197 (1994) ("Without the inducement of paid caretaking leave, few
men are likely to withstand the combined economic and peer pressure against significant
workplace absences."). But see Selmi, supra note 5, at 771-72 (suggesting that paid leave
alone will not induce substantial numbers of men to take long-term caregiving leave where
these men can use accrued vacation to fulfill their apparent preference for short-term leave).
218. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing call for paid FMLA leave);
Part V.A., supra (discussing Fineman's call for state funded wage replacement for
caregivers).
219. For scholarship discussing the potential for a social insurance system to compensate
caregivers, see, for example., Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 22, at 2214-20
(proposing "an insurance model for pregnancy leave based on the unemployment insurance
system" under which pregnant women would be entitled to twelve weeks of post-partum
benefit, a portion of which would be paid to their employers to ease dislocation costs);
Katherine Elizabeth Ulrich, Insuring Family Risks: Suggestions for a National Family
Policy and Wage Replacement, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2002) (reviewing various
methods of funding caregiving leave and recommending use of temporary disability
insurance supplemented by other programs).
220. See 20 C.F.R. § 604.1-604.21 (2003) (codification of DOL's final rule); President's
Memorandum on New Tools to Help Parents Balance Work and Family, 35 Weekly Comp.
Pres. Doc. 978, 979 (May 31, 1999) available at 1999 WL 12654559 (directing the
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experimental program, states were given the authorization to provide
unemployment compensation on a voluntary basis to employees taking
approved leave for purposes of caring for a newborn or newly adopted
child without jeopardizing their federally approved status.221 Many praised
"Baby Ul" as an appropriate and viable means of assisting working parents,
and sixteen states introduced legislation altering their state programs to
take advantage of the initiative.222 However, the enthusiasm quickly
dwindled. A coalition of business interests immediately filed suit
challenging the regulations as inconsistent with federal unemployment
compensation law and an inappropriate use of executive power.223 Within
six months of the final rulemaking, general elections yielded a new
Republican administration unsupportive of the DOL initiative. 4 Perhaps
most significantly, sharp economic decline, following the economic boom
of the late 1990s, placed previously abundant state unemployment coffers
at sudden risk of depletion.225 In December 2002, the DOL issued a Notice
Secretary of Labor to propose regulation that enable States to develop innovative ways of
using the Ut system to support parents on leave following the birth or adoption of a child).
For more information about the origin of the Presidential directive and the process by which
the BAA-UC regulations were enacted, see generally, Curtis Carpenter, Comment, LPA,
Inc. v. Herman's Unanswered Question: Is the Clinton Administration's Birth and Adoption
Unemployment Compensation Regulation Consistent with the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act?, 37 NEw ENG. L. REV. 63, 68-73 (2002).
221. See 20 C.F.R. § 604.2 (2003). Federal "permission" is necessary because a state
unemployment insurance system that does not meet the requirements of federal law is
ineligible for federal bailout funds and employers participating in a non-recognized state
system are not permitted to count their contributions against federal tax obligations imposed
under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. See 26 U.S.C. § 3302(a)(1) (2000) (allowing
credit for taxes paid under certified state law); 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a) (2000 & West Supp.
2003 I A) (enumerating requirements for federal approval of state unemployment laws). For
an overview of the structure of the Social Security Act's unemployment insurance system
and its relationship to state administered programs in this context, see generally Ulrich,
supra note 219, at 32-36; Carpenter, supra note 220, at 79-82; Comment, The Birth and
Adoption Unemployment Compensation Experiment: Did the Department of Labor Go Too
Far?, 106 DICK. L. REV. 367, 370-74 (2001).
222. See Ulrich, supra note 219, at 38 (identifying and describing state legislative bills
seeking to amend state unemployment law to take advantage of BAA-UC).
223. See Carpenter, supra note 220, at 76-79 (discussing suit). The lawsuit was
ultimately dismissed on procedural grounds, see LPA, Inc. v. Chao, 211 F. Supp. 2d 160,
162 (D.D.C. 2002), but many of the substantive arguments raised by the plaintiffs in
opposition to the regulations appear in the recent DOL Proposed Rulemaking calling for the
regulations' repeal. See 67 Fed. Reg. 72122, 72122 (Dec. 4, 2002) (noting that the lawsuit
"cause[d] the Department to scrutinize the underlying statutory authority for BAA-UC").
224. See Kirstin Downey, Funding Curbs on Parental Leaves Sought; Labor Dept.
Wants Change, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2002, at E4; Christopher Marquis, Bush to End Rule
Allowing Jobless Money for New Parents, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 4, 2002, at A22.
225. See Russell Gold, State Trust Funds for Unemployment are Being Depleted, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 24, 2002, at A2; Kirstin Downey Grimsley, State Funds for Jobless Run Low in
Slowdown, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2001, at El.
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of Proposed Rulemaking reversing its position of two years ago and
proposing to remove the regulations, which no state has ever
implemented.226
While this recent history could suggest that a federal system of wage
replacement is not viable, it can also be read as commenting primarily on
the use of the unemployment system as a vehicle for achieving paid family
leave rather than as a rejection of the underlying concept. The merger of
paid leave and unemployment insurance raises several debilitating
inconsistencies. The principle difficulty is the state law "able and
available" provisions that require eligible recipients of unemployment
funds to be actively seeking replacement work.227 While the DOL went to
lengths to finesse this point in its regulations, the fact remains that an
employee requiring leave from a current position to care for a new child is
neither able to work nor in need of new employment. 228 This doctrinal
point received perhaps the most attention from "Baby UI" critics, yet its
force lies in the broader objections that it reflects regarding the structure
and purpose of unemployment insurance. The current system is designed
to provide relief for workers who are experiencing temporary periods of
unemployment occasioned through no fault of their own, while at the same
time creating incentives for employers to limit layoffs. The latter goal is
accomplished by "experience rating" employers so that their tax obligation
roughly reflects the amount of unemployment they cause. 229 Although the
226. See 67 Fed. Reg. 72122, 72122 (Dec. 4, 2002) ("Upon completion of this review [of
DOL regulations], our conclusion is that the BAA-UC experiment is poor policy and a
misapplication of federal UC law.").
227. The "able and available" requirement for UI eligibility is not found in the federal
legislation implementing the unemployment compensation program, but rather is an
interpretation of the requirement that an individual be unemployed and continue to be
unemployed for the duration of his or her receipt of compensation. See generally 67 Fed.
Reg. 72122, 72123 (Dec. 4, 2002) (describing origin of the requirement); Carpenter, supra
note 220, at 89-91 (discussing FUTA's legislative history and comparing definitions of
"unemployed" in other statutory sources in justifying the "able and available" requirement).
It has, however, become a standard feature of state unemployment law.
228. The DOL takes the position in its final rule that providing compensation to parents
with work histories promotes long-term work attachment and analogizes to other instances
in which UI recipients are not "able and available" for new employment due to illness,
participation in job training, jury duty, or because the individual is on a temporary layoff.
See 65 Fed. Reg. 37210, 37213-14 (June 13, 2000). In its notice of the proposed removal of
the regulations, however, it indicates that these positions are inconsistent. See 67 Fed. Reg.
72122, 72122 (Dec. 4, 2002) ("[T]he UC program is designed to provide temporary wage
replacement to individuals who are unemployed due to lack of suitable work. However, the
intended recipients of BAA-UC generally do not meet [the able and available] test as they
have initiated their separation from the workforce and it is their personal situation, rather
than the lack of available work, that has removed them from the labor market.").
229. For a brief explanation of the mechanics of "experience rating" in unemployment
insurance and its limitations, see Gillian Lester, Unemployment and Wealth Redistribution,
49 UCLA L. REV. 335, 344-45 (2001).
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DOL regulations recommend that employers not be "charged" for use of
funds under "Baby Ul," such a solution is merely cosmetic. 230 Employers,
as a group, are still held responsible for departures that are not only outside
their control, but in the case of pregnancy and some forms of caregiving,
are often the result of voluntary behavior by the employee.23' While this
may ultimately prove good policy, it in no way follows from the bedrock
assumptions of the existing system.
232
Indeed what is most problematic about folding paid leave into the
unemployment system is that it equates caregiving with involuntary
departures from work that both employers and employees try to avoid.233
Other than in the case of family illness, employees' need for caregiving
leave is not an exogenous market event that one insures against, but rather
something that the employee chooses, and ideally something that
employers should enable through some form of deferred compensation.
Thus, an appropriate wage replacement program should be distinct from
unemployment insurance and premised on a different concept of
responsibility. California, for instance, recently enacted a system of paid
leave for FMLA eligible events that operates through its temporary
disability insurance program.234  Funded entirely through employee
230. See 65 Fed. Reg. 37210, 37215-16 (June 13, 2000) (allowing states to determine
whether to count BAA-UC payments against employer accounts and suggesting that BAA-
Ut recipients be treated comparably to other UI recipients whose separation is beyond an
employer's control for purposes of assessing employers' tax responsibilities).
231. Cf Lester, supra note 229, at 367-68 (noting that work absence caused by family
illness, while not voluntary, is attenuated from the typical hazards of working life and may
be the result of the worker's shifting personal priorities, making a system structured around
the risk of involuntary layoff a poor vehicle for insuring against such events).
232. Id. at 338 ("[A]t its core, UI is a scheme to provide compensation for involuntary
unemployment. No amount of tweaking, clarifying, or redefining of terms can alter the fact
that job loss is the critical moment for triggering recipiency."); Ulrich, supra note 219, at
41-42 (noting that "Ul's basic pillars-separation from the employer, the 'able and
available' and 'seeking work' requirements, and refusal of 'suitable employment'-would
all have to be waived" if UI were expanded to cover absences due to family risks and
suggesting that it is "better to start on a clean slate" in creating a caregiver wage
replacement program "than to work within the confines of a system that was designed for a
different purpose").
233. See Lester, supra note 229, at 385 (questioning "whether other forms of support for
working families might achieve similar goals [to expanding UI] without requiring a worker
to quit in order to collect benefits," and noting that "[d]irect provision of childcare subsidies,
or subsidies to firms willing to provide on-site daycare, seem preferable to tacking
assistance ... onto a program targeted at involuntary job loss").
234. See S.B. 1661 (Cal. 2002), Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 901. See also Lenhoff& Withers,
supra note 88, at 53-54 (advocating use of state temporary disability programs to provide
wage replacement for family caregivers); Ulrich, supra note 219, at 13-16 (advocating use
of state disability insurance and the creation of new programs to provide compensation for a
range of family/medical events and other work interruptions that fall outside the parameters
of unemployment compensation).
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contributions, the program grants eligible workers up to six weeks of
partial wage replacement for purposes of caring for a new child or a
seriously ill family member.235 Other states that mandate the provision of
temporary disability insurance are considering similar laws. 6
Modeling a program on temporary disability rather than
unemployment insurance, however, does not mean that paid caregiving
leave must be funded solely by employees. To the contrary, such an
approach perpetuates the view that caregiving is a private event beyond the
concern of the labor market, which could undermine efforts to obtain other
forms of employer accommodation. More importantly, the failure to
include any form of employer contribution requirement in a government-
administered system of paid caregiving leave foregoes an opportunity to
incentivize positive employer behavior that could reach beyond wage
replacement. One of the limits of both "Baby UI" and the California
disability program is that they provide compensation only to workers
absent due to FMLA eligible events.237 Such a choice is understandable
from an administrative perspective. It is difficult to conceive of a social
insurance system that would also mandate leave or other forms of employer
accommodation, and certainly the availability of wage replacement does
not address the problem of work culture or the marginalization of
caregivers within their work settings. 238 However, if employers are at least
partially responsible for contributing to the compensation fund, government
can offer them an opportunity to reduce their obligation by providing direct
benefits to employees. Already, several state disability programs allow
employers to "opt out" by providing private benefits that are at least as
235. See S.B. 1661 (Cal. 2002), Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 901.
236. See, e.g., S.B. 858 (Haw. 2003) (proposing expansion of temporary disability
insurance to provide wage replacement to employees unable to work due to the serious
health condition of a family member). See generally Ulrich, supra note 219, at 48-49
(summarizing substance of state legislative initiatives seeking to create or expand temporary
disability insurance programs to provide wage replacement for caregivers absent or on leave
from work).
237. Cf Ulrich, supra note 219, at 10-16 (expansively defining the type of "family
risks" that an employee might experience beyond FMLA eligible events, such as employer
changes in work requirements that conflict with family obligations; short absences for
emergency care or appointments; and longer absences occasioned by changes in family
structure, relocation, or the need to provide continued care for a family member; and
proposing a comprehensive system of job-protected leave and/or wage replacement for
those events using a combination of unemployment compensation, temporary disability
benefits, and new programs).
238. Indeed, the standard eligibility requirements associated with the existing
unemployment system, including assessments of prior workforce attachment based on
earnings levels and hours or weeks worked during a designated base period, operate to
exclude many part-time, reduced-time, and returning employees. See id. at 46-48; Ulrich,
supra note 219, at 40-41.
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generous as those provided by the state system.239 It is possible to extend
this model by tying employer contribution rates to other forms of
caregiving accommodation as well. States could devise a rating system
that would assess such things as the provision of leave time, assistance with
childcare, availability of reduced or flexible work hours, and other benefits
for caregivers, taking into account not only what the employer offers its
workforce but also the extent to which employees actually take advantage
of those benefits.24° In effect, the criteria would form a type of "reverse
experience rating" through which employers that provide-and encourage
employees to use-generous work/family benefits would be taxed less
than those that offer only limited or illusory accommodations to
caregivers.
241
In sum, an ideal system of caregiver wage replacement would be
based primarily on deductions from employee wages, while still requiring
some contribution from employers. Existing efforts to augment state
disability programs in the face of the imminent repeal of "Baby UI"
evidence potential support for such a system. Although a paid leave
program should have its own funds, it could be modeled on or even take
advantage of the administrative infrastructure for existing programs like
unemployment insurance and workers' compensation. Most importantly, a
government-facilitated wage replacement program can incorporate
incentives that encourage employers to adopt creative forms of caregiver
239. See Ulrich, supra note 219, at 44-48 (describing structure, administration, and
requirements of existing state temporary disabilities insurance programs).
240. Cf Selmi, supra note 5, at 775-76 (proposing a federal contract set-aside program
for which a contractor would become eligible only if a threshold percentage of its male and
female employees have availed themselves of the contractor's paid leave program); Ulrich,
supra note 219, at 50 (praising the "play or pay" model of social insurance that exempts
employers from contributions for providing equal or better benefits than the minimum state
requirement as creating incentives for employers to provide different and more expansive
programs).
241. Cf Selmi, supra note 5, at 777 (noting that under a contract set-aside program for
employers with good records of employee utilization of paid leave programs, employers
would be less likely to penalize employees for taking advantage of leave time and would
even encourage leave in order to benefit from the policy). In contrast, if a caregiving
insurance program were experience-rated in the traditional sense, that is, if employers were
taxed proportionate to their employees' use of benefits, employers would have an incentive
to avoid hiring workers who are likely to avail themselves of caregiving benefits (women),
or to pass the cost of the program onto those workers in the form of lower wages. See
Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 227-29, 291 (2000)
(discussing the relationship between accommodation mandates and anti-discrimination laws
and suggesting that where anti-discrimination laws are difficult to enforce, as in highly
segregated occupations, accommodation mandates benefiting women will result in decreases
in women's wages or employment levels); Ulrich, supra note 219, at 26-27 (advocating that
employer-funded caregiving benefits be funded through a non-experience rated social
insurance program in order to ensure that any resulting cost shifting by employers is borne
equally by all employees).
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accommodation, thereby providing additional benefits to caregivers in a
manner consistent with our existing social welfare system.
3. The Role of Collective Action
Because this paper has called for only modest government action in
the specific area of wage replacement for absent caregivers, private
employer behavior will remain critical in achieving equality for caregivers
at work. Earlier, this paper expressed the view that relying solely on
voluntary employer accommodation to widely redress caregiver
disadvantage would be unwise; yet a combination of legal and social
reform efforts hopefully can, in many instances, enhance voluntary conduct
by employers to achieve meaningful results. In large part, voluntary
initiatives should flow naturally from the adoption of an incentive-based
compensation system, as previously described. However, ensuring that
employer efforts are effective will require increased dialogue between
companies and their workforce through which appropriate work/family
initiatives can be identified, implemented, and monitored. Enabling that
type of communication requires the invigoration of traditional collective
bargaining as well as the development of new forms of worker concerted
action.
Focusing on collective action poses many challenges, the foremost
being the profound decline in union membership over the last half-century.
As a percentage of the non-agricultural workforce, union membership fell
from a height of between thirty-three and thirty-five percent during the
years 1944 to 1954 to roughly thirteen percent of workers by the year
2002.242 The numbers are somewhat better for public sector workers, and
unions do maintain a stronghold in particular industries.243 Overall,
however, they do not command a serious position in negotiating terms of
employment for most modem workers, in contrast to their historical
influence in this domain. 24 4 Moreover, even at their height, unions did a
242. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Union Members in 2002, at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm [hereinafter Union Members in 2002]
(reporting that the rate of labor union membership declined from 20.1% in 1983, the first
year the Department began comparing labor statistics, to 13.2% in 2002). See generally
Harry G. Hutchison, Reclaiming the Labor Movement Through Union Dues? A Postmodern
Perspective in the Mirror of Public Choice Theory, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 447, 450-54
(2000) (briefly describing the rise and fall in union membership since the 1935 passage of
the NLRA).
243. The most recent statistics show that, as of 2002, forty percent of the public
workforce was unionized in comparison with less than ten percent of the private workforce.
See Union Members in 2002, supra note 242.
244. A number of theories have been put forth to explain this phenomenon, including
increased resistance by employers, structural economic changes, changing worker
composition and preferences, the absence of legal reform, and unions' own lack of
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poor job at helping women workers. 245  In the collective bargaining
process, unions pressed for higher pay by calling for a "family wage," one
that would support a housewife and children, and often perceived women
as insufficiently attached to market work to become deeply involved in
collective action. 46 In these ways, unionism explicitly embraced the
gendered division between paid and family work and achieved gains for a
predominantly male constituency at the expense of women wage earners.
Notwithstanding its checkered history, collective action is essential to
the realization of greater caregiver equality for the simple reason that
collective action offers a bottom-up approach to institutional change that
can empower caregivers and avoid the risks associated with novel
legislative efforts. While some have questioned the redistributive effects of
accommodation mandates, 247 collective action has long been an accepted
commitment to organization. See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at
the Millennium: A Historical View and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 362-77
(2002) (discussing, among other influences, the rise of a globalized and service-oriented
economy, increased use of contingent labor, and the diversification of the workforce);
Cynthia Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527,
1530-31 (2002) (noting labor law's insulation from internal and external revision due to a
broad federal preemption doctrine and political impasse over congressional reform efforts,
among other factors); Paul Weiler & Guy Mundlak, New Directions for the Law of the
Workplace, 102 YALE L.J. 1907, 1912-13 (1993) (emphasizing the role of employer union
avoidance techniques). See generally CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE?: THE
REJUVENATION OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 34-55 (1993) (surveying various
causes of unions' decline).
245. See Marion Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of
Labor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1160-62 (1991) [hereinafter Crain, Feminizing Unions]
(describing how organized labor initially discriminated outright against women and later
ignored their interests once mainstream unions became nominally open to women); see also
Befort, supra note 244, at 365-66 (recognizing that women's interests have not been at the
forefront of unions' agenda, resulting in an 18.9% union participation rate by women
compared to 31% by men in 1980); Paul Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses andLimits of
Comparable Worth, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1728, 1800-01 (1986) (suggesting that women are
underrepresented in organized labor compared to their expressed interest in collective
representation); cf Rubin J. Garcia, New Voices at Work: Race and Gender Identity
Caucuses in the U.S. Labor Movement, 94 HASTINGS L.J. 79, 92-94 (2002) (describing
unions' historical exclusion of people of color, women, and immigrants who formed their
own minority caucuses).
246. See Crain, Feminizing Unions, supra note 245, at 1162-65 (discussing stereotypical
assumptions about family structure and women's workforce attachment that informed union
bargaining and campaigning efforts). Such patterns contributed to the image of unions as a
stronghold of white male privilege in lower-level manufacturing work that continues to
pervade the popular conception of organized labor. See Weiler & Mundlak, supra note 244,
at 1912 (noting the common assumption that "collective bargaining is an institution
primarily suited for male, blue-collar, production workers in the goods-producing industries
that were the bastion of unionism in its heyday").
247. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 47, at 347-55 (critiquing the ADA's
imposition of an unfunded and unspecified redistributive requirement that arbitrarily
burdens individual employers); Krieger, supra note 58, at 504-05 (discussing the popular
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democratic vehicle for pursuing such goals because it incorporates different
constituencies and yields voluntary exchange. 248 The interactive character
of collective action also enables issues of cost to be addressed in nuanced
ways that cannot be achieved through legislation of general applicability,249
and it avoids the problem of judicial retrenchment by bringing questions of
feasibility and reasonableness in-house. 250  At the same time, collective
action gives legitimacy to employer decisions that might otherwise be
perceived as benefiting some workers at the expense of others, reducing the
risk of internal backlash. Through collective action, workers can forge
coalitions across disparate groups, tying the interests of mothers to those of
non-traditional caregivers as well as to those of workers seeking flexibility
for personal reasons other than caregiving. 25' Finally, while the primary
concern here is enhancing the work experience of caregivers in a modest
but immediate way, collective action can ultimately build social support for
future legislation targeting caregiving in stronger terms, and it offers the
residual advantage of an established infrastructure for improving other
terms and conditions of employment for all workers.
2 52
Accomplishing these ends requires the revitalization of the defeated
culture of unionism and the rectification of labor's long disregard for
conception that the ADA privileges those capable of claiming disability status in ways that
may or may not effectuate corrective justice in individual cases).
248. See Stone, supra note 117, at 615-16 (discussing the role of unions in the
democratic process as vehicles for translating private interests into matters of shared public
concern); cf Crain, Feminizing Unions, supra note 245, at 1185 (noting that both feminism
and organized labor aim to transform existing social institutions in order to redistribute
power and resources to traditionally oppressed groups).
249. See Sturm, supra note 36, at 522-23 (describing limitations of rule-based approach
to employer regulation that is unable to take account of workplace context and the value of
internally generated systems attuned to the culture of specific organizations).
250. On Linda Hamilton Krieger's theory of retrenchment, see supra Part IV.C.
Professor Krieger argues that the risk of retrenchment in connection with transformative
legal efforts is reduced where (1) the transformative rules derive from the efforts and input
of those who will be governed by them, (2) the rules are enforced through alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms rather than litigation, and (3) the rules are openly and fully
debated before enactment. Krieger, supra note 58, at 501-02. The collective bargaining
process meets all of these requirements.
251. See Crain, Feminizing Unions, supra note 245, at 1156 (noting unions' potential for
opening channel of communication between women workers, including working class
women and women of color); cf Selmi, supra note 5, at 778 (suggesting that only when
caregiving becomes an issue for all workers, not just women, will family leave become part
of the standard employment benefits package).
252. See Crain, Feminizing Unions, supra note 245, at 1156 (suggesting that "feminized
labor unions could, through collective bargaining and political lobbying for legislation to
protect unorganized workers, politicize gender issues and transform the structures of work
and family"); Stone, supra note 117, at 616 (noting that unions are the only organized group
with an interest in pressing for social legislation regulating employment); cf Krieger, supra
note 58, at 501-03 (emphasizing the importance of grassroots-level discussion and
consensus-building in effectuating successful transformative legislation).
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women in organization and bargaining. While such tasks are challenging,
they fortunately coalesce. As Vicki Schultz points out most poignantly, in
a world of tenuous employment "almost all workers are in danger of
becoming 'women.' 253 The itinerant nature of many careers, the decline in
job security and employer-provided benefits, the absence of training, the
increase in average work hours, and the ever-intensifying competition that
characterizes many employment positions all parallel the obstacles and
disadvantages that women have historically battled in trying to be taken
seriously as market workers. More importantly, these realities make the
modern work site ripe for organization. Indeed, what is most distressing
about the rapidly dwindling union presence is that, in the "Me, Inc." world,
we need unions more than ever. 54
Just how unions and the law of collective action should respond in
meeting the challenges of the current century is a vast project that has been
tackled by many legal scholars, and the paragraphs that follow will
therefore consider only briefly the central themes of a targeted reform
effort.255 The core goal of such an initiative must be to enable employee
organization and representation to better reflect contemporary work
patterns. One component will be enhancing opportunities for collective
action by contingent workers, many of whom are mothers who lack any
employment benefits.2 5 6  Although the National Labor Relations Board
recently sanctioned the integration of temporary and permanent employees
in a single bargaining unit, this is only a partial solution. 257 There remain
253. Schultz, supra note 4, at 1919.
254. See Stone, supra note 117, at 616 ("[T]he new workplace threatens to exacerbate
problems of income inequality and employment discrimination, and unions are the only
significant organized groups that can combat these problematic tendencies.").
255. For more extensive discussion of possible forms of labor law and union reform, see
generally Befort, supra note 244, at 432-52; Stone, supra note 117, at 631-53; Paul C.
Weiler, A Principled Reshaping of Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century, 3 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 177 (2001). On extending union efforts and the reach of labor law to specific
employee constituencies in the current labor market, see, for example, Crain, Feminizing
Unions, supra note 245, at 1211-19 (on the viability of a feminist union agenda); Marion
Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor's Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1767, 1834-46 (on using
labor unions to protect the interests of minority workers); Alan Hyde, Employee
Organization in Silicon Valley: Networks, Ethnic Organization, and New Unions, 4 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 493, 495 (2002) (on the applicability of unionization to high-tech
employees); Peggie R. Smith, Organizing the Unorganizable: Private Paid Household
Workers and Approaches to Employee Representation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 46, 47-48 (on
organizing domestic and home care workers).
256. See Crain, Feminizing Unions, supra note 245, at 1215-17 (noting that women, and
in particular working mothers, incline toward the flexibility of part-time and temporary
positions, which are likely to fall outside the definition of employee or outside the
community of interests represented by a bargaining unit of permanent employees under
current law).
257. M.B. Sturgis, Inc. v. NLRB, 331 N.L.R.B. 1298, 1304 (2000) (holding that consent
requirements for multi-employer bargaining do not apply to units that combine jointly
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the significant logistical difficulties of how to organize and bargain for
workers who are deemed outside of the "community of interest"
represented by the employers' core workforce.258  By definition such
individuals are short-term workers with interests diverse from one another
who may have placements with multiple employers.2 59  Moreover,
independent contractors, an important subset of temporary employees, are
wholly excluded from coverage under federal labor laws, unable to bargain
even with a third party employment agency.
260
These obstacles may be addressed in part through statutory
261
amendment or judicial decision. Yet beneath the doctrinal issue of
which workers are subject to the laws lie broader questions about the role
of bargaining units in a fluid work environment. Katherine Stone has
suggested that because most modem workers lack job security, temporary
and "permanent" employees share similar interests and are appropriately
grouped in the same bargaining unit.262 At the same time, the mobility of
all workers suggests that the attachment of any employee to his or her
current employer may not be the best basis on which to structure a
bargaining relationship. Professor Stone has written convincingly of the
potential for a new form of "craft unionism" that may better suit the
structure of modem work relationships. 263  In a craft-oriented union,
employees would organize on the basis of a shared skill or occupation
rather than with respect to a particular employer. Such entities could
protect workers across employment lines, for instance, by negotiating
minimum terms and portable benefits, while responding to employers'
employed and solely employed employees of a single-user employer).
258. See id. at 1306 (reinstating community of interest tests and noting that application
of the rule will not always result in jointly-employed employee inclusion in solely-employed
employee units).
259. On the challenges of organizing contingent workers without access to integrated
bargaining units, see generally Bita Rahebi, Rethinking the National Labor Relations
Board's Treatment of Temporary Workers: Granting Greater Access to Unionization, 47
UCLAL. REV. 1105, 1114-15 (2000).
260. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(3) (1998) ("The term 'employee' . .. shall not include...
any individual having the status of an independent contractor ... ").
261. See, e.g., Befort, supra note 244, at 45-55 (advocating adoption of an "economic
realities" test for determining employee versus independent contractor status); Crain,
Feminizing Unions, supra note 245, at 1216-17 (urging expanded definition of "employee"
under the NLRA and Board adoption of a "disparity of interests" test that would place
burden on employer to demonstrate impropriety of an integrated bargaining unit).
262. See Stone, supra note 117, at 629 ("As the new psychological contract displaces the
old assumption of steady long-term employment, the distinction between temporary and
permanent employees becomes more and more arbitrary.").
263. Stone, supra note 117, at 633-40; see also Alan Hyde, Employee Organization in
Silicon Valley: Networks, Ethnic Organization, and New Unions, 4 U. PA. J. OF LABOR &
EMP. L. 493 (2002).
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desire for greater human resource flexibility.264
Implicitly, then, re-imagining unions involves more than regrouping
employees and employers in alternative bargaining units; it calls for a new
union agenda. A labor organization premised on fluid work patterns
necessarily relinquishes demands for long-term job security. As Professor
Stone notes, many of the traditional foci of union bargaining, including
demands for job security, defined positions, and predictable promotion
ladders, fundamentally conflict with the way management operates and the
way success is measured in the new workplace. 265 Pursuing those demands
not only antagonizes employers, it fails to resonate with many employees
whose paramount concerns may be access to training, severance, and other
benefits (including benefits for caregiving), more so than long-term job
security with one employer.266
In addition, while unions rethink their focus, they must also make
allowances for vehicles of worker-management communication that fall
outside of the traditional bargaining model. To do so requires reform of the
much debated National Labor Relations Act section 8(a)(2) prohibition
against employer-dominated labor organizations.267 In its current form,
section 8(a)(2) has been interpreted to preclude the type of employee
representation programs that many modem employers favor as a means of
discussing product quality and efficiency, as well as for obtaining general
suggestions about the workplace.268 Such interaction is essential to
264. For instance, unions could facilitate an embedded contract system in which
individual employees negotiate their own terms of employment within a framework
established by the union and applicable to all unionized employers in the industry. See
Stone, supra note 117, at 635 (discussing example of the "Basic Agreement" used by the
International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees, which is supplemented by a
"cover sheet," or appendix, containing individual terms).
265. See Stone, supra note 117, at 617-21.
266. See id at 615 (suggesting that contemporary unions should strive to enforce the new
social contract of employment, including employer promises of training, and ensure that
employers do not try to usurp employees' human capital).
267. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(2) (1998) ("It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or
contribute financial or other support to it."). See generally Befort, supra note 244, at 444-
46 (summarizing competing proposals for repeal and partial repeal of § 8(a)(2)). The 1997
"TEAM" Act, which would have reformed the prohibition, passed both houses of Congress
only to be vetoed by President Bill Clinton under pressure from organized labor. See
generally Estlund, supra note 244, at 1541 (briefly discussing legislative history of the
"TEAM" Act and its demise); Michael H. LeRoy, Employee Participation in the New
Millennium: Redefining a Labor Organization Under Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 72 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1651, 1706-10 (1999) (reviewing the text of the "TEAM" Act and its revisions
between the 104th and 105th Congresses).
268. See, e.g., Electromation, Inc., v. N.L.R.B., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 997 (1992) (finding
§ 8(a)(2) violation where employer established "action committees" comprised of
employees and members of management which discussed such subjects as
absenteeism/attendance, no-smoking policy, pay progression, and company "communication
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convince employers of the viability of restructuring work while
maintaining production standards and limiting costs. 269 It may also be the
only means through which employers and employees will communicate
about such issues in a work environment where a more formal labor
organization, even one with a revitalized bargaining agenda, is unlikely to
take root.27°
The potential for collective action in addressing work/family concerns
is apparent in several union efforts already underway. In 1994, for
instance, Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union ("HERE")
Local 2 in San Francisco succeeded in negotiating a reimbursement plan
with the city's unionized hotels to compensate employees for child and
elder care expenses.27' Participating employers contribute a set amount to
the plan's fund for every hour worked by a union member.272 Payment is
distributed on a quarterly basis to employees who incur expenses in six
coverage areas, including newborn care, formal and informal child care,
elder care, youth programs, and college preparation courses.273 The scope
and structure of the plan illustrates some of the advantages of privately
created and administered initiatives over government mandated programs.
The design of the plan's funding system reflects the work patterns of the
industry with employer contributions based on hours paid rather than total
wages and employee eligibility based on hours worked within the
preceding weeks rather than on long-term, full-time employment.274
network").
269. Many scholars and commentators have voiced support for § 8(a)(2) reform for
purposes of increasing employees' voice in workplace decisions. See, e.g., Befort, supra
note 244, at 447-48 (recommending reform through mandated works councils, comparable
to those supported by Western European countries, that would supplement traditional
unionism); LeRoy, supra note 267, at 1708-09 (recommending adoption of a revised
version of the "TEAM" Act); Weiler, supra note 255, at 200 (proposing that § 8(a)(2) be
limited to barring only company-dominated unions that engage in collective bargaining
rather than any employee organization that deals with the employer).
270. See Befort, supra note 244, at 443-44 (noting that "if labor law reform can fix only
a small part of the [gap between employees desiring and obtaining representation], some
other, alternative voice mechanism needs to be established"); Weiler, supra note 255, at 200
(suggesting that workers should be permitted to achieve representation through "an
improved labor law marketplace" in which employees can chose between committees or
unions).
271. See Carlise King et al., Child Care Choices for Working Families: Examining Child
Care Choices of Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union Local 2 Members
Working in San Francisco's Hospitality Industry, at 3, http://www.laborproject.org/ (n.d.).
272. The contribution rate is $0.18 per hour for every hour worked. Id. at 9.
273. See id
274. The Plan eligibility requirements provide:
"(1) You must be employed regularly three hours or more per day, five or more
days per week in at least three of the four full payroll weeks immediately
preceding the first day of the month for which contributions are due; or
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Moreover, the plan covers a range of caregiving expenses that union
members incur beyond those associated with the life events that trigger
FMLA leave. It is in these ways that a negotiated plan can be far more
specific to the needs of its constituency than a universal compensation fund
ministering to a multitude of industries and employers. Indeed the HERE
plan is amenable to frequent re-evaluation and change: Plan trustees, in
conjunction with several California non-profits, recently issued a
participant study evaluating use of the system and making
recommendations for improvement.
275
Thus, despite the challenges faced by organized labor, collective
actions must play a central role in facilitating work/family benefits for
employees. The first step is to enable labor law and encourage unions to
better respond to existing workplace dynamic and appeal to the sensibilities
of modem workers. If the broader problems of organized labor can be
addressed-and indeed they must in light of the need for employee
representation in establishing the terms and conditions of the new social
contract of employment-unions can certainly make meaningful progress
for caregivers by negotiating benefits and accommodations to complement
any existing or future legal entitlements.
VI. Conclusion
The goal of this paper has been to identify a pragmatic agenda for
improving the situation of working caregivers in order to further the project
of achieving workplace equality for women. Of central concern has been
the viability of legal initiatives premised on accommodation, or the idea
that government should compel employers to provide benefits to caregivers
or make work more accessible to them. The ideological basis of mandated
accommodation may be consistent with formal equality principles, and
certainly models of accommodation exist within the established arsenal of
employment claims. However, those laws have been less than successful in
changing systemic patterns of exclusion.
This paper has argued that these modest results are unsurprising and,
further, that they pre-vision the type of limited success that can be expected
from legislative efforts requiring accommodation of caregiving. Mandated
(2) You must be regularly scheduled for and work at least two (2) full shifts (six
or more hours) per payroll week, in at least three of the four full payroll weeks
of the employer immediately preceding the first day of the month for which
contributions are due."
CHILD CARE COORDINATING COUNCIL OF SAN MATEO COUNTY, LOCAL 2/HOSPITALITY
INDUSTRY CHILD AND ELDER CARE PROGRAM, http://www.thecouncil.net/12eligible.html
(n.d.).
275. King, supra note 271, at 6.
Vol. 12:345
Accommodation Subverted
accommodation as a vehicle for achieving change clashes fundamentally
with a core commitment to formal equality and market integrity that is
firmly ensconced in our culture and is currently redoubling in intensity. In
the "Me, Inc." economy, where employees are expected to act as
autonomous companies peddling their labor as a commodity, mandated
accommodation is not only politically infeasible, it invites significant
judicial and popular backlash that could seriously impair its effectiveness if
enacted.
Perhaps many of us, this author included, wish that it were not so. We
wish we lived in a world where workers had secure relationships of mutual
dependence with their employers, where caregiving was as respected as
market work, and where all individuals had the ability to earn a living wage
while preserving time to cultivate attachments to family and community
and to pursue activities of leisure and personal fulfillment. But the
question is not the desirability of that world order; the question is whether
it can be legislated. I fear that it cannot. When I think of the enactment of
transformative laws to drastically restructure work, I think of the optical
illusion that I invoked at the outset of this paper. I think about the viability
of superimposing a novel and aspirational life view over a well-entrenched
preexisting one, and I know that no matter how one looks at the young
woman in the drawing, the old one eventually peeks through.
So I call here for modest steps, steps that are in keeping with our
historical conception of the relationship between government and the
market and the evolving respect for worker independence and self-
motivation. These include the aggressive use of existing legal protections,
the establishment of a federally administered wage replacement system that
incentivizes voluntary employer accommodation, and the revitalization of
the culture of collective action to take advantage of these new incentives.
While these measures will not eliminate caregiver disadvantage, they can
have an immediate, meaningful impact on many workers and may
ultimately facilitate grassroots change that can support more aggressive
legislative efforts in the future. In the long run, less may be more.
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